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Abstract 
 Political theory that addresses morality’s role in politics most often emphasizes the need 
for political actors who are moral compromisers. Politicians have a responsibility to serve the 
people, and they will sometimes be faced with a dilemma: either stick to their personal morals or 
violate those morals because the political office requires it; many political theorists insist that 
these politicians should do the latter. These theorists value consensus as a fundamental 
cornerstone of democracy, and they associate a willingness to sacrifice one’s personal morality 
for the greater good with a democratic ideology and mindset. They typically dismiss the 
potentially positive influence that moral absolutists, especially ones who are able to build public 
support and therefore power behind their causes, might have on a democracy. This thesis 
challenges theorists to consider potential democratic benefits of oppositional moral absolutists 
who ground their arguments in democratic rhetoric and principles. It pushes these theorists, then, 
to consider both how oppositional moral absolutists and how confrontation and conflict might 
serve democratic interests and society. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement 
of the 1960s is used as the central case study to make this argument. 
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Preface    
Choosing a Topic 
 For anyone who aims to explain why America looks the way it does—politically, 
culturally, economically—and how America will look in the future, understanding past and 
current social movements is of prime importance. Social movements can provide a key to 
understanding American democratic society and how and why it has changed. They also feature 
some of our most interesting, inspiring and complex historical figures—perhaps it was these 
figures who first drew me to the subject.  
I noticed that when oppositional social movements were discussed in my political 
science, history, and sociology courses, professors typically identified a split among movement 
members: an absolutist and a compromising wing. Movement members agreed that some aspect 
of the political and social status quo was morally impermissible, but they differed in their 
assessment of how morally corrupt the system as a whole was—and how strictly they would 
adhere to their own oppositional values. Compromisers maintained that the system, flawed and 
immoral as it was in its current form, still allowed for meaningful change. They sought reform 
from within the system, either by electoral means or non-violent protests to which they hoped the 
government, ceding by choice to public pressure, would respond with improved policy.  
Moral absolutists, on the other hand, believed the current system was so morally defunct 
that it made significant compromise impossible. They tried to force the system to change by 
directly confronting it, as they had concluded that the system was too corrupted to respond to 
publically sanctioned pressure with meaningful reforms. Absolutists argued that the system was 
universally and unilaterally amoral, and that positive change was only attainable through 
fundamentally modifying (or abolishing) that system, its actors, and how we enacted democracy. 
This absolutist stance often justified violent actions among its adherents, but this was not always 
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the case: while increased militancy and confrontation with government forces was often the 
absolutist strategy, some absolutist groups eschewed violence. 
The evaluation of the split was usually the same: in my course lectures and readings I 
often learned the value of the compromisers in oppositional movements, but absolutists were 
usually ignored or dismissed as violent extremists whose actions were undemocratic—fringe 
cases who, if anything, hurt democratic proceedings. So it was a relatively uncontroversial 
depiction of Martin Luther King Jr., who was extolled, while Malcolm X was minimized, or the 
Gay Liberation Front, and not the Gay Activists’ Alliance, which received praise for its actions.  
And yet it was often the moral absolutists who inspired me. I became particularly 
interested in oppositional political actors who gave a morally absolutist critique which, because 
they closed it to debate and sometimes advocated violence, was in some ways undemocratic; and 
yet, because the activists grounded their arguments in democratic principles and their anger in 
the country’s failure to meet them, their critiques held ties to the concepts of justice, equality and 
individual rights to which I hold such a strong theoretical allegiance. I admired their bravery and 
connected to their anger, and I at times wished that I could commit myself so entirely and 
absolutely to a cause—sometimes, to their very causes. I wanted to fully embody and live by 
what I believed, to be willing to sacrifice everything on behalf of it. I didn’t consider myself to 
be a moral absolutist and I still don’t, but I was moved to ask: Do moral absolutists in 
oppositional social movements that seek the fulfillment of unmet democratic ideals contribute 
anything positive to the American democratic society they oppose? Could they take a leading 
role, directly challenging and confronting the system in place, and positively influence 
democracy?  
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In The Night is Dark and I Am Far From Home, I found an author who answered an 
emphatic ‘Yes’. Jonathan Kozol, who wrote the book in 1975 when he was a public school 
teacher in Boston, largely inspired me to find answers to my questions. He inspired me both 
because of his own moral absolutism and authentic fury and because he too found the lack of 
radical voices represented in the public education system problematic.ii He was angrier than I and 
sought to change the educational system, while I wanted to address political theory that I felt did 
not make room for moral absolutists, but we shared a respect for moral absolutists and a concern 
that many others seemingly did not. 
Deciding on a Case Study 
The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement fit my parameters as a powerful 
oppositional social movement with an absolutist critique and an internal split between more 
absolutist and compromising members. I was determined to evaluate both the influence of moral 
absolutists within the movement and the influence of the organization’s absolutist critique on 
democracy. I focused on 1968-1969 because these were both the years when SDS reached its 
height of power and when it eventually split into squabbling factions following multiple 
significant confrontations with the government and police forces. I looked through archives of 
the organization’s newspaper, New Left Notes, to see what members were saying, thinking and 
debating. And when I interrogated historical texts and political theory for answers and found 
them to different degrees unsatisfying, I tried to give my own. 
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Introduction: Kozol, SDS Background and What’s to Come    
Kozol’s Absolutist Argument in Defense of the Absolutist 
Kozol’s book is like the work of many of the radicals he espouses: it is unrelenting and 
angry and uncompromising. He takes a morally absolutist stance against the current education 
system and the society that has shaped, maintained and is serviced by it. He attacks those of us 
who are empathetic to causes but lack the passion or willingness to sacrifice on behalf of them. 
He condemns us for caring but not acting. And he claims that we have been trained to react in 
this passive way by an educational system whose “first and primary function…is not to educate 
good people, but good citizens.”iii Kozol does not mince words; he states on only the second 
page of chapter one, “I am in strongest opposition to the present social order of the U.S. and, for 
this reason only, to the lies which are inevitably purveyed by schools which stand in service to its 
flag and anthem.”iv The book is a heated piece with a morally absolute tone. 
In a chapter titled, “Great Men and Women,” Kozol takes on the public education system 
for what he terms its “detoxification” of radical historical figures.v He criticizes the depiction of 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as a “kindly, boring and respectful ‘Negro preacher’ with very light 
skin and rather banal views,”vi and that of Henry David Thoreau as “a nature writer.”vii He argues 
that these depictions are not, as some might say, an accidental mistake of the public schools, but 
rather a manifestation of their true intent. He writes, “The government is not in business to give 
voice to its disloyal opposition. Thoreau is dangerous.”viii He writes that it is the government’s 
conscious and logical decision to “contain with care the words and voices of those men and 
women who call forth in us the best things we are made of…[to] logically suppress, the danger 
constituted by the burning eyes of Malcolm X or the irreverent brilliance of Thoreau.”ix The 
passion of the opposition is silenced, or their critique softened until its punch is gone. 
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Even those historical figures whose passion and conviction do make it into the history 
books; even they, Kozol argues, are not meant to be models for a citizen’s behavior—they are 
depicted as worthy of praise, but not like ordinary people. He writes that public education hopes 
to create a citizenry that, when it “looks in the direction of Saint Francis, Thoreau, Hellen Keller, 
Dr. King, [what it sees] is a possible object for arm’s-length admiration and respect, but in no 
case an appropriate model for acceptable or even sane behavior.”x Students are taught, “They are 
too lofty: We are too banal.”xi Kids learn to compromise on their morals, to not strive to be the 
next King or Keller, Kozol writes, because “we build perimeters around the[ir] ethical 
aspirations.”xii Kozol argues that historical revisionism aims to, and successfully does, produce 
reliable, steadfast, and reasonable citizens who will not express moral indignation or oppose the 
government—resistance that Kozol believes we need. 
It is because these voices of resistance are silenced or their passion blunted to the point 
that it can no longer inspire us that we are so willing to live alongside injustice and inequality 
whose effect is to limit democracy and ensure that its ideals remain only that—ideals that will 
never be attained. It is because, Kozol writes, students are taught not to say ‘No’ unless they can 
provide constructive alternatives, that they later, as adults, fail to stand up and say ‘No’ to 
injustice. His book, however, is a book with a purpose. Kozol wants action from his readers; he 
says that those “people who are looking for ‘a lot of interesting ideas,’ and hope to dabble for a 
little more…offend the author and…would do well to stop [reading] right now.”xiii No: Kozol 
wants people who “read in order to take action on their consequent beliefs—” who feel that they 
are compelled to do so.xiv   
And if being moral means that individuals will have to make sacrifices, and Kozol insists 
they will, so be it—they should be prepared to make those sacrifices. He writes, “It is not good 
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enough to favor justice in high literary flourish and to feel compassion for the victims of the very 
system that sustains our privileged position. We must be able to disown and disavow that 
privileged position. If we cannot we are not ethical men and women, and do not lead lives worth 
living.”xv To Kozol, being moral reigns supreme—it’s what makes life worth living; for an 
individual to compromise his morals, or even for him to not stand and fight for them, is 
undeniably and absolutely wrong.  
 Kozol is a moral absolutist who argues that other absolutists deserve to be heard and 
valued as they are, alive and sometimes angry and threatening. But most political theory I read 
felt differently. This thesis is critical of and seeks to expand and build upon that theory. It does 
so largely through the history of an oppositional social movement with a critique that demanded 
more moral absolutism in politics and expressed fury over what it saw as the willingness of the 
political system and greater society to compromise on democratic principles and practices.  
 
Brief Background in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS): A Movement Founded in 
Opposition to the Moral Compromiser 
The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) movement of the 1960s took as its enemy 
the morally compromising politician it felt was not doing enough to meet the demands of the 
civil rights movement; who escalated the Cold War and led the country into the Vietnam War; 
and who stressed calm and rational discourse when there were potentially divisive and morally-
charged issues, and then didn’t consider real changes, instead pushing a vision of gradualism that 
wouldn’t rock the boat too much. SDS opposed the double-sidedness of these politicians: they 
felt offended and outraged when politicians spoke of democratic ideals and then followed a 
different ethical code when in power. SDS members were tired of moral compromise, of being 
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told one thing by politicians and then seeing them do something else; they were sick of being 
excluded from the decision-making process, of a politician in power assuming, like it will be 
shown that Michael Walzer encourages, that all his constituency wants him to make morally 
compromising decisions—and that no one could hold him accountable for having made them.  
 They felt that being ‘reasonable’ and striving for ‘consensus’ really meant acting without 
regard for morality. And because there was a post-war consensus that covered a wide range of 
political issues, they didn’t feel that there was a path for meaningful change within the political 
system. Both Republicans and Democrats had been sitting down and calmly discussing race 
relations and foreign policy for some time, and SDS members didn’t like where their rational 
discussions were leading the country. They were young; mostly college students, and they didn’t 
feel like they were being taken seriously, just as they felt that the enormous, fundamentally 
moral issues in front of them weren’t being taken seriously. 
 This feeling only increased as the 1960s progressed. The more SDS protested, the more 
militant they got and the more their membership grew, the more they saw the politicians in 
power ignore their demands—ignore their morality. The Vietnam War continued to escalate and 
the police fought back—violently—against student protests. Richard Nixon ran on a platform of 
law and order in 1968 and saw enormous success. The sides—‘us’ versus ‘them’—became more 
polarized, more pronounced—more absolutist. What had started as a movement motivated by 
anger over what SDS saw as a failure to live up to American and democratic ideals became one 
that now started to question those values themselves and whether they had ever really existed. It 
began to question larger aspects of the American political system, began to critique capitalism 
and the class system. It started to speak in terms of war, of revolution—though the seriousness of 
SDS’s commitment to these actions should, and will be in this thesis, questioned. 
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 Within the SDS movement itself there was also friction. The organization’s newspaper 
New Left Notes (NLN) was filled with aggressively antagonistic debates over strategy and tactics. 
One side, which mostly consisted of the Progressive Labor (PL) bloc, wanted to take a coalition- 
and base-building approach. They viewed the movement’s impact in terms of a “prolonged 
struggle;” they objected to the idea that the change they wanted could happen at that very 
moment.xvi They aimed at focusing on the working class as an ally against the political system: if 
only they could convince the working class, from which large numbers were being drafted into 
the War, to rise up with them, they argued, then the revolutionary goals of SDS could be 
achieved. They hoped to convince the working class that the capitalist system was oppressing 
them, and they idolized communist countries like Cuba and China. They objected to militant, all-
or-nothing protests, instead insisting that the movement’s attention should be focused on specific 
labor reforms and connecting to the working-class community. 
 The other side, what would remain SDS when PL in the summer of 1969 was kicked out 
of the organization, was more militant and less patient. That does not mean, of course, that they 
were all more violent—many members in SDS were committed to non-violence—though they 
often were, and they believed in sparking the types of confrontations that would inevitably lead 
to violence either by or against the police. They also supported the cause and tactics of the Black 
Panther organization, which famously believed in armed self-defense. More so than the PL, they 
held an absolutist ‘us’ or ‘them’ stance and viewed the government, and anyone else who did not 
hold their views, as the enemy. They were more moralistic than the PL, which criticized them for 
being less realistic and radical as a result.  
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 In the March 4, 1968 issue of NLN, member Eric Mann gave a crude summary of the 
split. He wrote of a “long-standing conflict among [movement] radicals—the battle of the ‘hards’ 
and the ‘softs.’”xvii He went on to classify and critique the former group: 
 The ‘hards’ are very concerned with maintaining an ideological 
and stylistic purity, believe that co-optation is the major threat to 
the Left, and often advocate measures considerably to the Left of 
their constituency. They argue that the role of a radical is to project 
challenging programs and analyses that ‘radicalize’ people’s 
thoughts and actions. The traditional pitfall of the ‘hards’ has been 
projecting programs and tactics that are irrelevant or harmful to the 
constituency they are trying to organize.xviii 
  
And the latter, PL-based group: 
The ‘softs’ argue that a radical must get involved with people’s 
immediate concerns and relate to the existing institutions in the 
society that affect people’s lives. They see the major threat to the 
Left as isolation. In practice, the ‘softs’ actually like American 
society more than they let on. But they often have a better 
understanding of the people than the ‘hards’ (partially because 
most Americans are more like the ‘softs’). They find it difficult to 
maintain a clear radical position in their day-to-day politics. They 
believe in winning reforms as both important in themselves and as 
stepping stones to building a radical movement, but have great 
difficulty in developing strategy to effect the latter…[they often] 
develop an analysis of ‘objective conditions’ that precludes radical 
action. ‘Personally, I think it’s a great idea; but the people aren’t 
ready for it now’.xix 
 
 These were the two central factions, but there were other voices as well. Some people 
still believed that change was possible through the electoral system and pushed for SDS 
members to vote for Eugene McCarthy or for a new political party, the People’s Freedom Party. 
And ultimately, when SDS would break up in 1969, there were still other factions, perhaps the 
most famous of which was the Weathermen, which because of its violent tactics was forced to 
operate underground. The degree to which any of these groups were morally absolutist is 
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debatable; what is certain is that each of them contained, at their core, absolutists who powered 
them forward.  
What’s to Come 
 Chapter one will review political theory that lauds and defends the moral compromisers 
who SDS so aggressively and passionately opposed. It will acknowledge Suzanne Dovi’s 
critique of their theory but I will argue that Dovi does not go far enough in her support of moral 
absolutists. Chapter two will explain, often through the members’ own statements, both why 
SDS’s morally absolute critique was valuable to democracy and why moral absolutism within 
the movement itself was essential. Chapter three will argue through SDS that confrontation and 
conflict are essential aspects of democracy that are undervalued by the political theorists cited in 
chapter one. And chapter four will note that while there are other political theorists who argue 
for a more conflict-heavy view of democracy, they do not sufficiently extend their appreciation 
to conflicts between uncompromising sides, or to the morally absolute political actors who can 
spark them. The abolitionist John Brown will be used to illustrate the fascinating and compelling 
character of the individual moral absolutist that goes unrecognized in these theorists’ work. The 
conclusion summarizes my argument clearly, explains why it is being made, and ties it into a 
larger debate with practical importance for political decisions being made today. 
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Chapter One: The Dirty-Hands Debate (and Shugarman)   
 I begin chapter one by providing a background into dirty-hands theory, based in Michael 
Walzer’s essay that defines a moral politician as an individual who is willing to sacrifice his 
personal morality for utilitarian ends—but feel guilty about having done so. I note how Walzer 
and other prominent theorists discount moral absolutists as unrealistic, undesirable, and even 
undemocratic political actors; even Max Weber, who envisions a role for moral absolutism 
within the individual, argues that it must be secondary to an ethic of responsibility more in line 
with political duties.  
Then I move into Suzanne Dovi’s self-described amendment to Walzer’s essay, in which 
she suggests that moral absolutism can have some positive role in the greater democratic political 
arena. Dovi argues that moral absolutists can benefit democracy both by acting as moral 
exemplars who through their actions reaffirm our own moral commitment and by pressuring 
dirty-hands politicians—who she still envisions in the most powerful political roles—to consider 
absolutist stances when making political decisions. I criticize Dovi for her complimentary vision 
of moral absolutists and compromisers, and I argue that moral absolutists often have and are 
inclined to take a directly antagonistic, powerful stand against moral compromisers in order to 
get compromisers to consider their stances; I contest her assumption that moral compromisers 
will do so voluntarily. In addition, I believe that Dovi undersells the value of moral absolutists by 
limiting their political power that might be potentially positive and not paying attention to their 
critiques or stances as much as the influence they have on others or the political system writ-
large. 
I end the chapter with David Shugarman’s critique of dirty-hands theory, in part because 
it identifies some of the potential dangers of advocating for politicians who compromise on their 
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morals and, as Walzer advocates and as I explain, on some fundamental democratic principles. 
More important, however, is the connection Shugarman makes between dirty-hands theory and 
its implications for the type of democracy that we want. Following Shugarman’s lead, in chapter 
three I consider how theory on morality in politics should relate to the type of democracy I think 
is most likely to lead to the realization of democratic principles, and I conclude that my own 
theory on morality in politics would make more room for conflict and disagreement than dirty-
hands theory allows. 
 
Michael Walzer and the Argument For Moral Compromise, Against Moral Absolutism 
 In “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Michael Walzer considers “a moral 
dilemma, a situation where [an individual] must choose between two courses of action both of 
which it would be wrong for him to undertake.”xx Specifically, he is concerned with a 
government official who is “forced to choose between upholding an important moral principle 
and avoiding some looming disaster.”xxi In this scenario, he imagines that the ‘right’ course of 
action in utilitarian terms may “leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong.”xxii Walzer 
dismisses the man who refuses to take the utilitarian action—the moral absolutist who does not 
observe a dilemma because he refuses to contemplate sacrificing his personal morals—as neither 
a realistic, moral nor desired politician. He is not realistic because the political office demands 
that a politician get his hands dirty; moral, because he fails his utilitarian duty to, as a politician, 
achieve the greatest good for the nation’s people; or desired, because, according to Walzer, the 
people who elected him want and expect him to get his hands dirty on their behalf.  
According to Walzer, the absolutist politician “not only fails to do the right thing (in 
utilitarian terms), he may also fail to measure up to the duties of his office (which imposes on 
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him a considerable responsibility for consequences and out-comes).”xxiii He says, matter-of-
factly, “We would not want to be governed by men who consistently adopted that [absolutist] 
position.”xxiv So, with absolutists no longer under consideration, Walzer sets out to determine the 
correct course of action for a politician faced with this moral dilemma. His goal in developing a 
theory, Walzer writes, “derives from an effort to refuse ‘absolutism’ without denying the reality 
of the moral dilemma.”xxv He denies moral absolutists but is not satisfied with the utilitarian 
argument that also concludes there is no moral dilemma—those utilitarians who so confidently 
assert that there are “calculations we might go through which would necessarily yield the 
conclusion that one or the other course of action was the right one to undertake in the 
circumstances (or that it did not matter which we undertook).”xxvi To Walzer, the situation is 
more complicated than either moral absolutists or calculating utilitarians are willing to admit. 
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that he takes aspects of each approach while denying either is 
plausible or sufficient on its own, arguing that it is a morally compromising politician—someone 
with a ‘soft’ perspective on politics—who is best equipped to handle the dilemma. Morality is 
still important to this person, but he is ultimately willing to offend his personal morals for a 
higher, utilitarian moral end.  
Walzer argues that moral compromisers, importantly racked by guilt despite performing 
the politically ‘right’ action, are the only desirable politicians in a high-functioning 
democracy.xxvii He identifies a moral politician by his willingness to sacrifice his personal 
morality—and feel guilty about having done so—for a higher moral end. He writes, “Here is a 
moral politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral man and nothing 
else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing else, he would pretend that 
they were clean.”xxviii Here is the alternative to a moral absolutist, who refuses to compromise his 
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morals for utilitarian reasons; and calculating utilitarian, who does not feel that his utilitarian 
decision—proven absolutely to be the right one by his calculations—has marked him in any way 
as a guilty man.  
Walzer gives an example in which a moral individual running for political office is faced 
with a tough decision: make an illegal deal with a corrupt ward boss and win the election, or stay 
true to his democratic morals and lose. The individual, Walzer says, should make the deal 
because “we want him to make it, precisely because he has scruples about it.”xxix Earlier, of 
course, Walzer claims that moral sacrifice is not only a necessary aspect of the political office—
it is necessary to gain political appointment in the first place. He writes pointedly, “No one 
succeeds in politics without getting his hands dirty.”xxx So perhaps we should not be surprised by 
Walzer’s acceptance of campaign fraud as not only an activity in which a politician might 
engage, but one in which he should engage. Walzer provides a second example, too, and 
although it largely cites the same reasons for the politician to compromise his own morals—the 
political office calls for it, utilitarianism demands it, and his supporters want him to do it—it 
illustrates Walzer’s willingness to apply his theory even to those cases when choosing a higher 
moral end means breaking one’s more fundamental moral principles. Walzer concludes that a 
politician elected partly on an anti-torture platform and who “believes that torture is wrong, 
indeed abominable, not just sometimes, but always,”xxxi should nonetheless “authorize the torture 
of a captured rebel leader who knows or probably knows the location of a number of bombs 
hidden in apartment buildings around the city, set to go off within the next twenty-four 
hours.”xxxii  
So Walzer is firmly in the ‘soft’ camp, and he proposes a familiar dichotomy in its favor: 
Moral compromisers, because of their willingness to compromise, are therefore both politically 
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reasonable and democratic, as a representative democracy rests on consensus and the notion that 
political actors will follow the wishes and demands of their constituencies (made up of people 
who, according to Walzer, want morally compromising politicians as their representatives). In 
Suzanne Dovi’s critique of Walzer’s work, “Guilt and the Problem of Dirty Hands,” she writes, 
“Walzer sees the willingness to compromise one’s moral principles in the service of achieving 
consensus as essential to the proper participation of public officials in democratic political 
processes.”xxxiii This leads Walzer, Dovi adds, to conclude, “The proper functioning of 
democratic institutions is tied to having political actors who are moral compromisers.”xxxiv 
It follows that moral absolutists, on the other hand, because of their unwillingness to 
compromise, are not only unreasonable but also undemocratic. Dovi notes Walzer’s “suspicion 
that absolutists are less committed to democratic values than are those who are willing to 
compromise their moral principles for morally important political ends.”xxxv Further, “Walzer 
portrays those who refuse to be opportunistic and sacrifice their moral principles to negotiate 
with others in democracies – specifically the far left and the far right – as ‘contemptuous of the 
people or, at least, of selected portions of the people.’”xxxvi To be morally uncompromising is to 
dismiss the values of certain segments of the population; Walzer asserts that the refusal to 
compromise on one’s own morals suggests intolerance for opposing views—and that this is 
detrimental to a democracy.  
According to Dovi, Walzer sees a “commitment to exile one’s opponents as the only 
alternative to striking compromises with them,”xxxvii and that “those who refuse to compromise 
endanger freedom because they undermine the conditions that make individual choice 
possible.”xxxviii In the end, “for Walzer, compromise is the political disposition necessary for 
toleration and pluralism.”xxxix He does not appear to recognize any potentially positive role to be 
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played by moral absolutists, only acknowledging them so far as to label them a threat or at the 
very least an obstacle to democratic principles and institutions. Dovi observes that Walzer seems 
to believe that “it is best to have only guilt-ridden, dirty-handed politicians in the political 
arena.”xl 
In “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber also considers moral compromisers and 
absolutists—and takes a similar stance as Walzer, ultimately concluding that the compromiser is 
the only one fit for political rule, though he must still value his moral convictions. Weber says of 
individuals who subscribe to the ethic of conviction—the moral absolutists: “If evil 
consequences flow from an action done out of pure conviction, this type of person holds the 
world, not the doer, responsible, or the stupidity of others, or the will of God who made them 
thus.”xli While the absolutist refuses to wait for society to affirm his convictions, the individual 
motivated by the ethic of responsibility (often political in nature, as a politician’s responsibility 
to his state and its citizens)—the moral compromiser—is willing to make moral concessions. 
Weber writes: “A man who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility, by contrast, will make 
allowances for precisely these everyday shortcomings in people.”xlii The moral compromiser 
thinks rationally of the consequences of his actions, and may concede his personal morality if he 
believes acting in full accordance with it will bring about a negative end for the greater 
population for which he is responsible.  
Weber suggests that both ethical approaches should be present in a politician, but he 
gives the ethic of responsibility precedence over the ethic of conviction. He writes of the two 
together: “They are complimentary to one another, and only in combination do they produce the 
true human being who is capable of having a ‘vocation for politics.”xliii And yet Weber equates 
the ethic of responsibility with the politician, and the ethic of conviction with the Gospel; it is 
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clear that Weber considers the former ethical system more central to a politician than the latter. 
He writes that a moral absolutist’s actions, “judged from the point of view of their possible 
success, are utterly irrational, and…can and are only intended to have exemplary value.”xliv A 
politician must make moral compromises, but he must also retain the strength that comes with an 
ethic of conviction. “Only someone who is certain that he will not be broken when the world, 
seen from his point of view, is too stupid or base for what he wants to offer it, and who is certain 
that he will be able to say ‘Nevertheless’ in spite of everything—only someone like this has a 
‘vocation’ for politics.”xlv The ethic of conviction, then, or the impulse to stick to one’s moral 
values in all situations, provides a necessary power of will, but it is irrational and should cede its 
place to a rational, morally compromising side.  
Moral absolutists can through their irrational actions at best inspire us and “express a 
kind of dignity.”xlvi The moral absolutist may follow the noble maxim ‘“resist not evil with 
force,’”xlvii but the politician cannot do the same. Unlike a moral absolutist, a politician must 
answer to his political office, which requires moral compromise. The politician follows a 
contrary maxim, one motivated by the ethic of responsibility: “‘You shall resist evil with force, 
for if you do not, you are responsible for the spread of evil.’”xlviii It may be nice to privately stick 
to one’s morals, but serving the public demands a higher level of responsibility—and a 
willingness to compromise those morals. 
 In “Dirty Hands,” Martin Hollis more explicitly and fully explains the prevalent reasons 
for dismissing the potential political role of moral absolutists. First he dismisses the absolutist as 
shortsighted and ignorant. He says that it is only “the simple one [who] equates the integrity of 
the individual with unswerving obedience to conscience or to curt moral imperatives in all 
situations.”xlix Moral absolutists underestimate the complexity of issues and are overmatched in 
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politics. Hollis takes up the aforementioned argument that the political office simply demands 
moral compromise and is incompatible with moral absolutism. He writes that an individual 
absolutely committed to his morals is necessarily a martyr, and he continues: “The martyr 
concedes nothing to the differing moral opinions of his neighbors, whereas the statesman 
represents both the martyr and his neighbors…Hence the martyr yields nothing for the sake of 
constructing the moral consensus without which the statesman cannot work.”l A politician must 
represent the interests of his entire constituency; similar to Walzer, Hollis argues that a moral 
absolutist, because he concedes nothing to—or, as Walzer suggests, is even contemptuous of—
opposing values, is not qualified to hold political office. 
Democratic politics demands consensus, which in turn demands a willingness to 
compromise, and therefore moral absolutists have no place in politics. Unlike Walzer, however, 
Hollis does see moral absolutists having some small potentially positive impact, if only an 
indirect one that does not require them to serve in a political office, on democratic citizens. He 
writes that absolutists can inspire our admiration of their moral commitment because they go “to 
the stake” for their beliefs.li Moral absolutists’ dedication to their beliefs, the argument goes, may 
make ‘normal’ people stop for a moment to consider how highly they value their own morals—
in the extreme case, an absolutist may even cause an individual to reevaluate what those values 
are, or should be. Max Weber makes a similar argument about moral absolutists in “Politics as a 
Vocation” when he says that the irrational actions of moral absolutists can at best inspire us and 
“express a kind of dignity.”lii The moral absolutist is someone who we respect for his 
unwavering moral commitment but scorn for that very same commitment, which we also view as 
irrational, impractical, and undemocratically intolerant. 
Hollis also advances Walzer’s argument that a moral absolutist—his moral rigidity in 
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violation of democratic norms—with political power poses a danger because he may rule 
tyrannically. According to Hollis, a moral absolutist—or martyr “let loose with political power, 
he sends others to the stake with an equal will and, in shutting his eyes to the moral nuances of 
political life without thereby abolishing them, he licenses very foul play, provided that it is 
conducted outside the limits of his simple moral lexicon.”liii An unwillingness to adapt one’s 
moral guidelines suggests an individual is not only too simple-minded for politics; he is also 
dangerously undemocratic. He is not useful as a politician whose office requires a flexible 
commitment to morality, or in a greater political arena that should aim at fostering the 
democratic ideals of consensus and tolerance. 
Dovi’s Amendment 
 In “Guilt and the Problem of Dirty Hands,” Suzanne Dovi offers a soft challenge to 
Walzer’s dirty-hands theory and its quick dismissal of moral absolutists. Despite adopting an 
assuaging tone at times—she says she hopes her account “complements Walzer’s discussion”liv 
and characterizes her argument as “a friendly amendment to his basic position…that we should 
favor dirt-handed and guilt-ridden politicians over absolutist ones—”lv Dovi asks questions 
rooted in the same curiosity about moral absolutists that drives this thesis. In asking the questions 
she does and putting forth even a soft challenge, Dovi carries the dirty-hands discussion forward.  
 Dovi, like me, wants to know why Walzer so quickly eliminates moral absolutists from his 
discussion, and she argues that absolutists actually play an integral role in maintaining a morally 
healthy democratic polity. It is because of her work that I ask how does—and not simply does—
moral absolutism benefit democracy; it is her argument, which proposes that moral absolutists do 
benefit democracy, upon which I hope to expand and build. But I ultimately level the same 
charge against her that she levels against Walzer: largely, that her argument is “incomplete 
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because…[she] fails to recognize adequately the indispensable role played in a morally healthy 
polity by political actors who refuse to compromise their moral integrity, even for some morally 
desirable end.”lvi Before criticizing and hopefully building upon her critique, however, it is 
necessary to explain her challenge to Walzer, one in which I found a lot of truth—and that in a 
large part inspired me to write this thesis.  
 Early in “Guilt and the Problem of Dirty Hands,” Dovi questions Walzer’s decision to only 
focus on the individual political actor. She proposes that a single action taken by an individual 
politician can influence the moral standing of the larger political arena—and that we need a 
moral political arena if we want moral—or Walzerian—politicians. She writes of Walzer’s 
essay: “This individualistic approach to the problem of dirty hands ignores the cumulative effects 
that individual dirty-handed decisions can have on the polity as a whole.”lvii Dovi believes that 
Walzer’s focus is too narrow, and to ascertain if there is a positive role for moral absolutists she 
widens it to consider the entire polity. She finds that there is, in fact, such a positive role: When 
the moral standing of the greater polity is considered, Dovi contends that moral absolutists are a 
necessity; she writes that “a morally healthy polity requires absolutists as well as Walzerian 
moral compromisers.”lviii If anything, she believes the polity needs more, not fewer, absolutists: 
“In contrast to Walzer’s recommendation to judge moral politicians by their willingness to 
compromise for morally expedient ends, I would argue that the existing political climate supports 
such compromises too easily.”lix  
 Dovi challenges Walzer to consider some of the benefits of moral absolutists. She writes, 
“But it seems to me that, not infrequently, one should refuse to compromise one’s moral 
commitments for the sake of achieving desirable political ends.”lx Without moral absolutists, 
Dovi argues, the polity risks “moral corruption”lxi and a limited “range of moral choices.”lxii 
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With regard to the former issue, Dovi says she worries that “moral compromise can weaken a 
polity’s commitment to ethical values.”lxiii According to Dovi, a polity that only includes moral 
compromisers would run the risk of routinizing immoral action and might begin to feature 
citizens and politicians who either had no sense of morality or did not consider acting morally a 
high priority. She writes, “Dirty-handed decisions – even ones for morally important political 
gains – can dull the intensity of certain [moral] commitments.”lxiv  
 Moral absolutists lead by example, and their unwavering commitment to their own moral 
values maintains and can increase the presence and value of morality for others—including our 
political representatives. Dovi writes, “Sometimes, we come to comprehend fully what is 
morally at stake only when we witness how much people are willing to sacrifice for their 
morals.”lxv Perhaps most significantly, politicians continue to think hard about compromising 
their morals for a perceived morally expedient end—and, having compromised their morals, they 
truly feel guilty. As Dovi points out, it is essential to his theory that Walzer’s moral politicians 
have high moral standards—and feel guilty about breaking them.  
 A polity only consisting of moral compromisers, as Walzer envisions, would, therefore, 
likely be incompatible with his own theory, as “dirty-hands political actors, though initially guilt-
ridden, may not have the moral resources necessary for sustaining the emotional response of 
guilt crucial to Walzer’s method of negotiating the problem of dirty hands.”lxvi It is moral 
absolutists that make this negotiation possible: “By acting according to their 
convictions…absolutists…make vivid what political actors with dirty hands should feel guilty 
about. In this way, absolutists can set and maintain high moral benchmarks.”lxvii Walzer writes 
that dirty-hands politicians should feel guilt, but he does not acknowledge that it is often 
“absolutists [who] can prevent our capacity to feel guilt from being dulled.”lxviii Without 
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absolutists, Dovi argues, there becomes less and less to compromise on; politicians do not feel 
guilty because they forget what they were meant to feel guilty about. 
Dovi also pushes Walzer on his claim that moral absolutists are undemocratic, suggesting 
instead that the very values on which moral absolutists refuse to compromise can be democratic 
ones. In her view, absolutists can reinforce democratic values whose existence might otherwise 
be threatened. Dovi writes of absolutists on the political left, “Indeed, their unwillingness to 
compromise core liberal democratic values can help preserve, or even restore, the polity’s 
commitment to these values, a commitment vital to the health of democratic institutions.”lxix She 
continues on to say that a willingness to compromise on these core liberal values could 
ultimately spell the end of the political left altogether, and that this would be a dangerous 
development:  
Indeed, the willingness to compromise these values in order to 
reach an unsatisfactory agreement with anti-democratic political 
opponents [on the political right] – especially given that many of 
them will be absolutists – far from making the left politically 
relevant, can make the left politically irrelevant.lxx 
 
 Dovi argues that we really need these absolutists, not only to strengthen our own moral 
commitments but also because they can influence policy by expanding the number of moral 
options available to politicians. An absolutist pacifist on the political left who gets public support 
behind her campaign against war “can in doing so place pressure on military and political leaders 
to conduct war in ways that minimize [human] costs.”lxxi Or absolutists can make politically 
challenging moral stances more palatable to the public by presenting a more extreme alternative. 
Dovi writes: “Guilt-ridden political actors with dirty hands look more ‘reasonable’ and gain 
political leverage by contrasting their own views to those of the absolutists.”lxxii She gives as an 
example Malcolm X, who by “present[ing] the white world with a threatening alternative”lxxiii to 
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Martin Luther King Jr. made the latter figure “seem more acceptable to a wide segment of the 
American public.”lxxiv Absolutists, then, can contribute to the democratic polity by pressuring 
dirty-hands politicians into including for consideration “morally preferable options”lxxv and by 
“expand[ing] the negotiating room”lxxvi of those same politicians by providing the public with an 
unreasonable alternative. 
Evaluating Dovi’s Critique: Asking that it Go Further 
Dovi’s critique is insufficient; although she acknowledges that moral absolutism is 
necessary in a high-functioning democracy, she also aligns herself too much with the 
compromisers. She thinks too often of a symbiotic, or complimentary, relationship between 
moral absolutist and Walzer-type politicians, one in which the absolutists—usually on the fringe 
of politics, and excluded from positions of power—express their opinions and, having reminded 
the dirty-hands politicians and the general public of morality, exit the stage. Not once does Dovi 
suggest that a moral absolutist playing a major oppositional role—powerful, and directly 
threatening a dirty-hands politician’s hold on power—might play a primary part in improving the 
greater democratic polity.  
 Although she doles out greater responsibility to moral absolutists than the aforementioned 
theorists, her argument concerning moral corruption echoes that of Weber and Hollis: Just as 
they speak of absolutist martyrs who exist to inspire us, Dovi writes that moral absolutists can 
improve the health of the democratic polity by serving as “moral exemplars” who remind us of 
the importance of morality.lxxvii So it is that, like with Weber and Hollis’s absolutist martyrs, 
“people’s willingness to make sacrifices for their moral ideals can inspire others to rethink and 
deepen their own moral commitments.”lxxviii  
 What is clear in both Weber and Dovi’s analysis of moral absolutists is that they fear moral 
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absolutism in a directly oppositional role to moral compromise; they both stress, to the different 
extents that they recognize moral absolutism can be of some benefit to the political system, that 
it can at best contribute by complementing—or offering a soft challenge to—moral compromise. 
Before establishing that absolutism can play a positive political role, albeit a subservient one to 
moral compromise, Weber is quick to state that “the ethics of conviction and the ethics of 
responsibility are not absolute opposites.”lxxix And even when Dovi acknowledges the potential 
benefits of political opposition between the two parties, she does not put them on equal footing. 
It is the absolutist pacifist whose oppositional values might, if she garners enough public support 
behind her cause, pressure the moral compromiser in charge into considering a less violent 
military strategy. Or it is Malcolm X whose opposition is of value only because it allows the 
moral compromiser to appear more reasonable to the public. Moral compromisers always retain 
the upper hand, and an absolutist challenge to their hold on legitimacy is never considered as a 
potentially positive event. Consensus is surely an important aspect of democracy, but what of 
conflict? What of clashing ideas and values? Are political theorists overemphasizing the value of 
consensus? 
Dovi assigns Malcolm X—who as a powerful and directly antagonisticlxxx moral 
absolutist presents an interesting exception to her usual example—only a secondary role; he is 
only important because his ‘unreasonable’ stance expands the dirty-hands politician’s negotiating 
power. Are we to believe that this—along with the absolutist martyr who serves as a moral 
exemplar—is the only positive contribution to democracy that can be made by a directly 
antagonistic moral absolutist? Nothing is said about the greater significance of Malcolm X and 
his movement taken alone; Dovi lends no credence to Malcolm X’s arguments and why they 
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found so much support, nor does she examine the role of the dirty-hands politician and his 
response to the absolutist movement. Dovi only focuses on Malcolm X’s secondary importance. 
By recognizing that moral absolutists can benefit democracy Dovi has moved the 
discussion in the right direction, but the potentially positive role she prescribes absolutists is still 
too limited in scope. I will argue that moral absolutists playing a bigger and more antagonistic 
role than the one Dovi identifies can also benefit democracy. Existing dirty-hands literature on 
morality’s role in democratic politics overemphasizes consensus, failing to recognize that 
confrontation is also essential.  
Shugarman on Democracy and Dirty Hands  
 In his essay “Democratic Dirty Hands?” David Shugarman offers a more fundamental 
critique of Walzer’s dirty-hands theory. Unlike Dovi, who proposes an amendment to dirty hands 
that includes a limited role for moral absolutists and considers the greater political arena, 
Shugarman takes issue with Walzer’s theory in its entirety. For Shugarman, “crucial aspects in 
both the theory and practice of dirty hands…are jarringly at odds with those of democracy.”lxxxi 
At best, those aspects can be seen as related to a “narrow, elitist form of democracy…marked by 
autocratic features and dispositions that have much more to do with a military mentality and 
authoritarian paternalism than with thoroughgoing democracy.”lxxxii This is not the type of 
democracy that Shugarman envisions as ideal or believes we should pursue. 
 For Shugarman, the notion that citizens should support and expect a politician to rig an 
election—Walzer’s first hypothetical—is damaging to democratic politics. If rigging an election 
is excused, Shugarman argues, then “it will be difficult to expect others not to do so in the 
future.”lxxxiii His vision of a participatory democracy demands adherence to democratic principles 
like free and fair elections. It “calls for elected leaders to exhibit transparency…openness…and 
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accountability…on an ongoing basis.”lxxxiv In his democracy, the people are engaged in politics 
and decisions are not only under the purview of an all-powerful leader.  Instead, “citizens have to 
persuade each other of the merits of change, and of the substance and pace of particular preferred 
changes.”lxxxv The political system does not aim to give politicians, elected undemocratically, full 
reign over important decisions, nor does it expect citizens to be able to identify a politician’s 
level of guilt—a step that should not be necessary if democratic procedures are followed. 
 Shugarman objects not only to the idea that dirty-hands theory is compatible with 
democratic principles, but also to the suggestion that “dirty hands and politics are inextricably 
linked—”lxxxvi that “dirty hands are a staple of politics.”lxxxvii In Shugarman’s view, Walzer’s 
torture hypothetical is hardly a common situation; he argues that to treat the response to it and 
other exceptional situations that demand that individuals go against their morals as a norm is 
dangerous because doing so encourages people to abandon alternative, preferable tools for 
resolving dilemmas that are typically at one’s disposal. He writes, “In this view, recourse to dirty 
hands is an extreme exception to democratic politics rather than a staple of it and resort to such 
tactics is the result of failure of politics and a turn to war.”lxxxviii Further, Shugarman does not 
consider the decision of an individual to overrule his principles in one of these extreme situations 
as a signal that he has strayed from his morality, and Shugarman does not believe that the 
individual has anything to feel guilty about. People need not consider themselves moral 
absolutists: “It is misleading to depict the world as a place where most people can be expected to 
be, and expect others to be, pure deontologists except for ‘gifted’ politicians who are expected to 
know that they cannot be.”lxxxix  
 Shugarman questions whether Walzer’s dirty-hands theory subscribes to or seeks to attain a 
desirable form of democratic politics. There are weaknesses to Shugarman’s arguments—his 
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quick dismissal of the moral dilemma Walzer proposes, for example, and his decision not to 
address if Walzer’s theory is more applicable to politics as they actually are, perhaps darker than 
Shugarman’s vision but based in reality—and he does not argue for an increased role for moral 
absolutists, instead suggesting that no one should be expected to be morally absolute. But 
Shugarman’s essay is of value to this thesis because it raises the question of how political theory 
relates to our vision for a democracy. Following his lead, I will similarly bring into the 
discussion what democracy should be, ultimately concluding that a vision that excludes moral 
absolutists fails to acknowledge the value of conflict and clashes among different, 
uncompromising segments of a democratic population and between citizens and the government. 
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Chapter Two: More on SDS, and the Benefits of a Morally 
Absolute Critique and Moral Absolutists Within an Oppositional 
Social Movement  
Political theorists who dismiss moral absolutists and Dovi, who does not go far enough in 
her support of them, miss that powerful moral absolutists are essential to democracy because 
they both remind people of their values and morally compromising politicians of what they are to 
feel guilty about. They remind us of the moral questions present in political decisions and open 
up the possible range of moral perspectives. Often they need to take a primary, directly 
oppositional role to government because it is individuals in power and within the political system 
who are often the most morally corrupted and, because they benefit most from that system in its 
current form, unwilling to consider difficult moral questions unless they are forced. Moral 
absolutists can help expose undemocratic or amoral political actions that would otherwise remain 
well hidden; they can help hold people in power morally accountable. In doing so, they can make 
sure that the dirty-hands politician weighs even harder the decision to act immorally for the 
greater good—perhaps not all his constituents want him to do so, and absolutist ones will make 
him stand by his actions publically, whether he feels guilty about them or not. Walzer assumes 
there will always be a moral side of a dirty-hands politician that he should override, but Walzer 
fails to appreciate how that side might disappear without the existence of moral absolutists.  
Moral absolutists are also an essential ingredient of any social movement that aims to 
achieve fundamental changes in society.xc Just as they can reinforce the moral commitment of 
the population at large, within a movement moral absolutists also help create a core commitment 
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to the group’s cause from which less absolutist members can draw. For individuals in opposition 
to be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to affect change against the wishes of entrenched 
leaders who usually have superior coercive power, that commitment is vital. So is a certain 
absolutist understanding of the political situation—that it is ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘good’ versus 
‘evil’; with these strict lines drawn, it becomes easier to sacrifice oneself to a cause which 
otherwise might not appear to be in one’s immediate rational self-interest. 
 I begin this chapter by showing how SDS was a movement largely founded in opposition 
to the older generation and its political leaders’ tendency toward moral compromise. Their anger 
and frustration at the policies that resulted from this compromise show some of the potential 
problems of moral compromise, and how moral compromisers must at times be directly opposed 
by organizations like SDS that hold an absolutist critique, regardless of how many of their 
members are really absolutist. I will argue, largely through SDS’s own statements and editorials 
published in its newspaper NLN, that insisting on compromise can often really excuse one from 
having to consider the moral ramifications of one’s actions. It can also mean there is less and less 
to compromise on, to the point where morals no longer become part of the discussion. I will 
show how SDS sought to hold the politicians accountable for their actions and expose those that 
were undemocratic and immoral, and I will argue that these efforts were beneficial to society. I 
will show how SDS brought morality back into politics and helped expose aspects of the political 
system that needed to be altered. 
Then I will move inside the movement itself and detail the debate within the 
organization. I will show that SDS failed in some respects because it was not absolutist enough 
(in chapter three, I will address how absolutist actions also contributed to SDS’ downfall). I will 
argue that SDS members were unwilling to make the kind of sacrifices that would have been 
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necessary for the movement to achieve its aspirations, and that if they had been more absolutist 
in their moral commitment to their cause, they may have been more successful. Being absolutist 
may be irrational and even scary, but it can also be a sign of courage and strength. Although 
absolutism can, because of the commitment it entails, lead into desperate and violent measures, 
this need not always be the case. In chapter three, I will argue that a confrontation and 
negotiation structure, with moral absolutists leading the way with the former and the 
compromisers with the latter, which almost took form within SDS, would have been the ideal 
strategy for the organization to employ to help it achieve its ambitious ends.  
 
SDS Positions Itself In Opposition to Moral Compromise 
 Walzer makes two assumptions which SDS powerfully called into question: first, that the 
morally compromising politician faced with a moral dilemma knows which action will bring 
about the greatest good for the greatest number of people; and second, that when the individual 
political actor makes this decision, he does so with the blessing of the people on whose behalf he 
makes it. Any censure comes from the politician himself: he feels guilty for having compromised 
his morals, but there is no one to hold him accountable for his actions—nor, Walzer asserts, 
should there be, because we want him to make the decision he ultimately made. The politician 
owes no one an explanation for his action, and he makes it alone. Entering a world they found 
oddly at ease with decisions and actions they viewed as morally repellent, SDS youth did not feel 
that they should have to abide silently while these politicians apparently did these things on their 
behalf. It was not, they cried out, in their or the country’s best interests to escalate the war in 
Vietnam or to continue to deny black Americans their civil rights—and they wanted it to be 
understood that they did not give their blessing. 
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They were sick of the Walzer-approved politician who runs on an anti-torture platform 
and tortures when he’s in office, and then—if the information is ever leaked—says he did it in 
their best interests.xci This feeling was especially magnified at a time when both parties supported 
the Cold War, and the liberal, John F. Kennedy, who had promised change and inspiration and 
spoke loftily of fundamental American values, led the country into the Bay of Pigs and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. They were offended by these leaders’ hypocrisy, and they were angered by 
thoughts of where moral compromise had and would lead. 
 In the group’s 1962 political manifesto the Port Huron Statement, SDS spoke on behalf 
of the “people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, 
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.”xcii Largely the products of middle-class liberal 
families, they wrote that they identified their childhood both with the notion that the United 
States was the “wealthiest and strongest country in the world”xciii and a nation that stood for and 
was guided by just, democratic principles—“freedom and equality for each individual, [and a] 
government of, by, and for the people.”xciv And so their confidence was shaken as they saw the 
safety and moral certainty of which they had been assured growing up clearly and seriously in 
doubt. Subjected to the Cold War, they learned to live under “the presence of the Bomb, [which] 
brought awareness that we ourselves, and our friends, and millions of abstract ‘others’ we 
knew…might die at any time.”xcv Witnesses to the civil rights struggle for freedoms and 
privileges they had been taught were already granted to all citizens, early SDS members saw the 
basic human respect and dignity they thought the country stood for contradicted in the white 
racism that had necessitated and now pushed back violently against the civil rights movement. 
These issues were “too immediate and crushing in their impact,” too morally troubling, for SDS 
members to ignore.xcvi What they saw as the “paradoxes…and hypocrisy of American ideals”xcvii 
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imbued them with a sense of “urgency”xcviii and a desire to alter the direction of events. Why was 
the country not living up to its promises—and why was this failure understood by political actors 
and the older generation to be normal and acceptable? Why should they wait to see the country 
meet the values they had been taught were already met—were the pillars on which the country 
was built?  
 But what was perhaps most troubling to these students who would become the foundation 
for the New Left movement of the 1960s was the sense that, in the face of these enormously 
troubling and real concerns, few Americans shared their intense and immediate need to confront 
and try to fix these problems. Agreement and consensus, rationality, calmness and patience, were 
valued; discord, anger, and even change were undesirable. Todd Gitlin, who would in 1963 
become the president of Harvard SDS, writes, “Republicans and Democrats disputed whether the 
primary agent of insecurity was internal or external Communism, but virtually the whole society 
agreed that the Soviet state posed a serious threat to peace and the American way of life.”xcix He 
added, “Passionate as was the impetus, the tone of the enterprise remained moderate.”c SDS 
lamented in its manifesto of the majority of society, “They fear change itself, since change might 
smash whatever invisible framework seems to hold back chaos for them now. For most 
Americans, all crusades are suspect, threatening.”ci  
 Parents who had grown up during the Depression and lived through a World War were 
now experiencing material comforts unparalleled in their lives. Many of them moved to the 
suburbs, about which popular culture held an idyllic vision. They saw their own and others’ 
economic improvement and concluded that most social problems would be solved in due time. 
Writes Gitlin of the prevailing liberal view, “If some people were left out of the mainstream, if 
there were still (in a common phrase) ‘pockets of poverty,’ these were exceptional; they could 
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soon and easily be taken care of. Social problems were, in another well-worn phrase, ‘unfinished 
business.’”cii The ideals and values were there, but the requisite action to bring about their 
fruition was not. There was “a glaring discrepancy between promise and 
performance…Liberalism stood for equality, but lacked the means, or the will, or the blood-and-
guts desire, to bring it about.”ciii Further, now that many liberals had achieved the middle-class 
status for which they had worked, they found themselves less willing to take risks to affect 
changes that could threaten their own, recently acquired status. Gitlin writes, “Organized 
liberalism…had made its bargain with affluence; it passed on its ideals to its children, but spoke 
in the voice of the proprietor…the unspoken language of property and complacency.”civ 
In an interview, Gitlin explained to me the development of SDS and youth politics in 
straightforward terms.  
 You see a great deal wrong with the world, and so you survey the 
territory to find out what to do about it. Naturally, you look at your 
family and ask yourself: How did it happen that they left me this 
world? At a young age, you develop a rebellious attitude. You find 
yourself moralistic, and it’s then that you start looking critically…I 
can remember imputing an enormous amount of responsibility to 
my parents.cv   
            
           For many SDS members, then, their politics were rooted in a sense of opposition to their 
parent’s generation and what they considered to be its moral failures. Gitlin writes, “We were 
going to be active where our parents’ generation had been passive, potent where…they had 
finally proved impotent.”cvi They wanted to achieve liberalism’s unmet promises—the 
“commitment to justice, peace, equality, and personal freedom which their parents professed.”cvii 
They were willing—felt compelled—to take the action they felt was necessary to bring about the 
change they wanted in the world. Unlike their parents, they were “not going to take evil lying 
down—this practical moralism was a good part of the movement’s appeal...They tended to think 
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that, in succeeding, their parents had failed—some by giving up, some by settling for material 
rewards.”cviii Where their parents had compromised or been complacent, SDS members aimed to 
be resolute and active. What good were morals unless they were put into practice? 
 Not having grown up during the Depression, SDS members were unsatisfied with 
material comfort as a refuge against Cold War politics they feared could end their world at any 
moment and as they watched a minority group fight against deeply entrenched American racism. 
Not having been politically active during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, or 
economically desperate when he introduced New Deal legislation, they did not recognize “the 
government [as] the natural ally of the common people at home and the natural enemy of 
totalitarianism abroad.”cix Free from the fear of economic insecurity and without any property of 
their own to lose, SDS youth could afford to be more radical than their parents. Inherent in the 
New Left movement was “a generational identity: New Left, meaning neither Old Left nor 
liberal,”cx but defining itself as what it was not also meant there was an opposition, especially as 
the Vietnam War continued to escalate, a sense it was a moral ‘us’ against a morally 
compromising ‘them’—those politicians, liberal or conservative, it did not matter, entrenched in 
a corrupted political system that had distorted or failed to live up to American values. What 
Gitlin identifies as “youthful difference…leaped into a self-conscious sense of opposition.”cxi  
             The New Left increasingly took aim at these politicians and their notion of gradualism 
and consensus; they argued that these men who preached being ‘reasonable’ and calm and 
believed that the democratic system was functioning adequately, were actually committing 
morally unacceptable atrocities. Gradualism meant putting off necessary changes; consensus 
meant quieting dissent. Students in SDS and the greater New Left movement grew increasingly 
frustrated as they saw politicians respond to their moral arguments with disdain and a call for 
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order or with promises of change that never came. In the March 25, 1968 edition of NLN, 
member Eric Mann argued, “The whole structure is designed to accommodate without actually 
changing anything. A whole aura of ‘let’s be reasonable’ is built in.”cxii For SDSers like Mann, 
the issues and opinions considered reasonable by the establishment didn’t include much space 
for disagreement or progress. 
 
Opening Up the Range of Moral Perspectives 
 It may at first appear odd to suggest that moral absolutists, who by their very definition 
are not open to debate on certain issues, can open up the possible range of perspectives and help 
make for a richer and more morally thoughtful democratic system. But as SDS discovered—and 
by no means were all SDS members moral absolutists on all issues, or even absolute in their 
commitment to them, but the organization’s critique was one that insisted that more absolutism 
on certain issues was necessary (more on this later)—a system in which compromise and 
consensus is emphasized, if it goes unchallenged, can become one that only considers a small 
number of issues open for debate. Democrats and Republicans were largely in agreement on 
issues of foreign policy, and SDS members did not feel that the liberal option was nearly liberal 
enough. They’d find that while politicians preached compromise and reaching one’s hands 
across the table, they weren’t thinking of reaching a great distance—especially not to 
accommodate the wishes of disgruntled, largely middle-class college students. 
 Perhaps in part because SDS and the New Left movement was primarily a youth 
movement, its members felt that their demands were not being taken seriously. Mann identified 
“a widespread fear among radical students that their parents’ cynical dismissal of student protest 
as a last fling before a lifetime of submission may be accurate.”cxiii Gitlin remembered feeling as 
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if “the official reactions had ranged from ‘barely concealed condescension to political 
dismissal.”cxiv He recalled with frustration, “We had apprenticed to insiders, fine-tuned our 
expertise, made the right friends, tried to influence the right people, spoken their language—now 
where were the signs that knowledge meant power?”cxv They struggled to convince the 
establishment that their concerns were serious, and that they would not disappear from the 
political scene without a fight. Even after SDS occupied Columbia University and skirmished 
with police, University President Grayson Kirk took a gradual approach to reform that did not 
seem to match the intensity of the situation.  
On a “Face the Nation” interview, Kirk acknowledged that students had been asking for a 
greater say in university regulations for some time, but he asserted that his administration “had 
moved pretty far in this direction.”cxvi He continued, “We have been negotiating for some weeks 
about the appointment of an all-university Director of Student Interests.”cxvii Asked if the 
students would have any say in the appointment, Kirk responded that they would not: despite the 
militant takeover of an elite university, the amount of change acceptable to the administration 
was relatively minimal. A student protest at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
ended when “the University Administration met with the leaders of the demonstrations—some of 
which had drawn eight hundred to a thousand people—expressing sympathy for their general 
aims and concerns, but neglecting to act on demands.”cxviii 
 Sometimes a show of sympathy without real change to accompany it worked, but often 
this approach and others that dismissed or did not fully acknowledge the seriousness of the youth 
movement had an opposite, radicalizing effect. Mann contributed “the ultra-revolutionary 
posturing in our movement” to the student anxiety he had identified—that parents were right 
when they condescended about the seriousness of the movement.cxix Gitlin found himself 
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attracted to SDS in part because he “shared [with other members] the fervent desire to find a 
community of peers to take seriously and be taken seriously by.”cxx Considering the militant turn 
SDS would ultimately take, it may be worth speculating if things could have been different had 
the adults who SDS challenged taken the organization’s concerns more seriously. 
 But as the liberal elite seemed increasingly unwilling to compromise, so did SDS. They 
felt that politicians from the Democratic Party did not offer a path toward change, and one of 
their most significant fears was being co-opted by the old-school liberals. An article in NLN 
titled “Eugene as Lyndon” indicated that the peace candidate wasn’t so different from the 
Democratic president who had escalated the war in Vietnam. It read: “Any politically aware 
person knows that McCarthy offers no real alternative to Johnson’s imperialist policies…Sad to 
relate, some of the calcified bourbons of the Old Left, who never forget and never learn, are 
again singing the praises of ‘the lesser evil.’”cxxi Kit Bakke wrote in September of 1968 that SDS 
“is also aware of the danger of co-optation by liberal elements…designed to play the same role 
that McCarthy has admitted in his own—to channel dissent that is politically radical into 
Democratic Party confines.”cxxii To SDS, co-optation meant that Old Left politicians would, 
despite throwing surface support to New Left causes for votes, fail to inject the moralism that 
SDS felt was missing from politics. One SDS member wrote, “The liberal wing of the corporate 
power structure (the ruling class) are good at co-opting (or taking over and using for their own 
non-human ends) the human concern that moves many of our generation.”cxxiii This was not the 
change that SDS envisioned. 
 Carl Oglesby denounced the argument of McCarthy supporters that SDS members should 
be more politically realistic by lessening their demands and voting for the peace candidate, who 
could at the very least do less poorly than the other politicians. He argued that a more radical 
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critique of the political system and its political parties was too valuable to compromise. 
Abandoning it would maintain the same consensus-focused amoral politics SDS was fighting 
against. 
Granted the sincerity of his occasional New Left-sounding 
flourishes, McCarthy’s ‘practicality’ amounts in the end to the 
adulteration of the necessary critique of the War, the obscuring of 
its sources in the system of American expansionism. It amounts to a 
moderating of already timid proposals which therefore lose 
whatever character they might have had…No question: Such a 
policy is ‘practical’, ‘possible’, and ‘realistic’. We’ve had it for 
years.cxxiv 
 
 If reasonable politics are what led to the Vietnam War, they charged, maybe it was time 
to be unreasonable. A December 1967 editorial in the University of California-Berkeley’s 
student newspaper Ramparts illustrates the growing anger among New Leftists at the politicians 
in Washington and their prevailing preference for compromise. Titled, “Hell No, We Won’t Go!” 
it defended the actions of anti-war demonstrators in Washington, whose tactics had been 
criticized as too extreme both by the politicians whose policies they challenged and by much of 
the general public. 
 The editors wrote, “It is the thesis of this essay that the reasonable man has become the 
enemy of this society at this time.  His reason has been soured by compromise and his moral 
conscience traded for a conscience of conciliation.  The capacity to ask fundamental questions 
appears to have been lost.”cxxv The argument of the editorial largely parallels my own in the next 
chapter: “This lack of fundamental opposition to men—or ideas—in power has been the greatest 
danger stemming from the liberal consensus. Political decisions have been made without the 
benefit of strong and clashing political ideas—from the left, or from the right—and the inevitable 
result has been the stagnation and corruption of the center.”cxxvi Conflict and discord, necessary 
elements of democracy, were being silenced, and democracy was worse off because of it. 
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 Demonstrators and the New Left largely blamed an insistence on acting reasonable for 
the morally troubling situation in which they now found themselves. They attacked the values of 
consensus and compromise as excuses for ignoring the moral implications of political actions, 
and they suggested that some issues warranted a black-and-white, absolutist understanding: 
In a society which so values comfort and where conciliation (some would use the 
word co-option) is generally and usually successfully employed to smooth over 
any troublesome rifts in the consensus, there is little room for the indiscriminate 
exercise of moral indignation.  In this sense, it is easy to understand how the 
uncompromising goals and populist tactics of the dissenters in the streets could be 
so repulsive to the comfortable, conciliatory, and reasonable men whose material 
stake in life, along with their honest social and political beliefs, are all tied, in 
their entirety, to comfort, conciliation and reasonableness. But understanding is 
not excusing.cxxvii  
  
 It was unreasonable men that the country needed; SDS felt that at a time when morality 
was not an integral part of the politicians’ decision-making process, individuals who were 
perhaps irrationally motivated by morals were needed to bring the discussion back to morality. 
The editors thanked these individuals:  
  Fortunately, there are also unreasonable men in America…convinced that as of 
now, the democratic process is incapable of responding to the intensity of today’s 
moral crisis which has crystallized over Vietnam, and that the system must be 
confronted, changed, opened again before it is too late.  Conscience, they insist—
in a cry as American as the dream of reasonableness itself—is more human, more 
important, than can be any devotion to procedure.”cxxviii  
  
  The editors wrote, “Charging the Pentagon is not nice, and neither is burning draft 
cards…But to hundreds of thousands of citizens the war in Vietnam is so incredibly monstrous, 
its goals so undefined, its methods so horrible, its escalation so relentless, that the moral 
imperative to oppose it has overbalanced the need for respectability; it demands a break in life 
style.”cxxix It was time to stop being nice: morality demanded it. The issue was black-and-white, 
and there could be no compromise. SDS and the New Left were growing impatient, and many 
members decided that if the government wouldn’t listen to their demands, they would have to 
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force it to listen. The editors continued, “Every American must realize that resistance and 
militant protest is going to continue; it will grow as the war grows, and it will not go away until 
the war ends. That is the nature of a moral imperative.”cxxx The goal? That “the increased 
militancy of the protestors does in fact represent a threat to the stability of society.”cxxxi  
 Demonstrators stated their willingness to fight for a cause that they felt morally 
compelled them to act. These disagreements were fundamental and conflict unavoidable; they 
were about issues for which compromise was not possible. The editors wrote, “The consensus by 
which this country operates is simply not programmed to deal with moral crises.”cxxxii After all, 
its not as if the sides were close to agreement but hit a snag in negotiation; the editors argued the 
“division is reducible to rather elemental terms.”cxxxiii  The establishment believed that “any 
attempt at effecting change which departs from the channels and assumptions of that system is 
not only disorderly but dangerous.”cxxxiv The editors countered, “The democratic process…is not 
providing real political alternatives to the voters or allowing legitimate channels for the 
discussion of such alternatives. If you doubt that, ask somebody who voted for Johnson against 
Goldwater.”cxxxv Both sides supported the escalation of the Vietnam War. To anti-war 
demonstrators who fervently believed that actions in Vietnam were morally unacceptable, then, it 
was necessary to take on the system as a whole, and to do so in an unreasonable way. If the 
stability the compromisers valued so much was threatened, then would they listen? 
 
Two Uncompromising Sides: the Response of the Morally Compromising Politician to Militant 
Protest, and a Reason to Question Dovi’s Theory   
 For SDS, it became clear to most members that the system was not willing to adopt the 
types of changes or the attitude of urgency for which they felt the situation called. When Dovi 
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writes that moral absolutists benefit democracy by expanding the range of moral options 
available to the dirty-hands politician, she fails to recognize that politicians in power may be 
unwilling to listen or even respond to absolutist challenges unless they feel that those absolutists 
directly threaten their claim to legitimacy or hold on power. Dovi assumes that dirty-hands 
politicians are willing to listen, or can be convinced to sit at the table with a relatively small 
showing of support for the absolutist cause. And yet SDS, which in 1968 was at the height of its 
power, with membership totaling roughly a hundred thousand and supporters numbering in the 
millions,cxxxvi  had not yet received such an understanding reception. More militant 
demonstrations would, in fact, get the government’s attention, but that did not mean that 
compromisers would now be willing to listen. 
 From a series of confrontations that turned violent in 1968, SDS would find that, if 
directly challenged, the system would respond—but not with careful consideration and rational 
discourse. Confrontations between SDS and the government in 1968—the final full year that 
SDS was in operation and also the year during which it was most powerful and influential—
showed that the other side was not going to take militant and unreasonable demonstration tactics 
lightly. If many SDS members appeared morally absolute in their conviction that they were in 
the right and the government and its police forces in the wrong, it appeared that the other side 
had come to a similar conclusion. Officials in power did not take well to these challenges; just as 
SDS revved up its membership for full-scale confrontation, so did the other side.  
 Over the course of the year, SDS discovered that the militant, unreasonable tactics that 
the Ramparts editors encouraged would not be met with discussion: even reasonable men, it 
seemed, had their limits. Gone was the government’s insistence on compromise—if protestors 
were going to act unreasonably, so would they. And yet it was often difficult to identify which 
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side was provoking which, as each typically claimed that the other had escalated the conflict. 
Confrontations between SDS and the police were violent affairs, and the recounts of protests in 
NLN often read like battle scenes.  
 In February, editors recapped events in Orangeburg, South Carolina that left three student 
protestors dead and 50 injured using this language. They wrote: “City and state police 
surrounded the schools and invaded the campuses…the Guardsmen led an assault onto the 
campus, shooting wildly at the students, who were unarmed. The police had shotguns, rifles, and 
M-16s.”cxxxvii  The editors felt the lesson from the event was clear: “We must fight—much, much 
harder than ever before—on every front.”cxxxviii  A student from one of the universities 
commented in a follow-up article: ‘“It was cold-blooded murder…Murder. We’ll never let them 
get away with something like this again.’”cxxxix Describing police violence against blacks, the 
SDS National Council went so far as to compare police actions to genocide. They wrote in a 
resolution, “There is no other way to interpret the mobilization and militarization of local police, 
state police, and National Guardsmen in and around the black ghettos of the whole country.”cxl 
 While these SDS accounts in NLN were likely biased in favor of the protesters, it seems 
clear that the government and its police forces often matched SDS’s uncompromising nature, and 
may have contributed to the movement’s move toward militancy, radicalism, and in some cases, 
violence. After a bloody confrontation between police and protestors in Oakland, Mayor Alioto 
called the demonstrators ‘“neo-fascist student-types’…[and said] ‘if charges of police brutality 
are brought up by any of those arrested…they would not have enough evidence to support such 
allegations.”’cxli At a George Wallace rally in Omaha, Nebraska in March of 1968, SDS claimed 
that demonstrators were the ones with peaceful intentions. SDS member Tim Andrews wrote that 
the marchers “wanted to show the people of Omaha that they were not at all for this appearance 
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of a white bigot in Omaha, but that the furthest thing from their minds was any use of violence to 
prevent him from speaking.”cxlii He added, “The average black person did not like Wallace, but it 
was also very clear that the demonstrators had no intention of physically disrupting his 
speech.”cxliii While Andrews admitted that protestors heckled Wallace, he claimed that the 
Republican presidential candidate could still be heard over their complaints. He cried foul over 
the police officers’ intentions, adding, “Heckling does not by any stretch of the imagination 
justify premeditated police violence and aggression.”cxliv 
 In his mind and the minds of other SDS members who clashed with police officers in 
1968, it was the government’s actors who were acting unreasonable and absolutist—and, SDS 
asserted, undemocratic. According to Andrews, Wallace taunted the demonstrators, calling them 
‘“un-American.’”cxlv Andrews argued that by refusing to act police officers showed racist a 
double standard, claiming, “(If [militant black civil rights activist] Rap Brown did this, they 
would arrest him for inciting a riot.)”cxlvi According to Andrews, police then attacked the non-
violent protestors with MACE and beat them as they tried to flee the auditorium. Andrews 
charged the media with falsely presenting the violence as having been provoked by the black 
demonstrators. In a common argument that often ended articles such as this one, Andrews then 
suggested that it was the violence of the compromising politician and his police force that had 
radicalized the opposition, and not the other way around. Andrews wrote, “Before [the black 
protestors] had hoped that by peaceful demonstration something could be accomplished; now 
they knew this would be impossible. The only course left to them was a full-scale riot.”cxlvii It 
was the dirty-hands politician who had held the absolutist line: “Obviously this is what Mr. 
Wallace wants—to stir up enough hatred so that peaceful negotiations are impossible, and 
violence is the one thing the Negro has left. Then he will get the white backlash vote.”cxlviii 
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 Gitlin’s description of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley’s preparations for the 1968 
Democratic Convention, at which SDS had promised large non-violent protests, also suggests 
that the self-identified reasonable, compromising politician could be equally absolutist—with a 
superior coercive force at his disposal—in his conception of which side was right and which 
wrong. It appeared that Daley and the Chicago police were unwilling to allow SDS the 
opportunity to protest peacefully. According to Gitlin, SDS members Tom Hayden and Rennie 
Davis “tried to reassure the media that they wouldn’t try to stop the convention from taking 
place, but the police and federal agents who were monitoring their moves inflated their 
ambiguous hints of violent confrontation into an unambiguous threat to the convention.”cxlix 
Making the New Left movement appear violent and threatening took potential public support 
away from the movement and justified police violence against the agitators. Gitlin writes, 
“Stalling on permits, Daley proceeded with fortifications.”cl During this time, Hayden and Davis 
“were being tailed, around the clock, by plainclothesmen conspicuously displaying their guns 
and growling threats.”cli The SDS newspaper NLN claimed, “Mayor Daley has now made it clear 
that even the most peaceful protest is no longer possible in this city.”clii  
 Largely because Daley and the Chicago police force made it clear that the confrontation 
was going to be a violent one, many SDS members committed to non-violence stayed away from 
the confrontation. Gitlin wrote that in the months leading up to the Convention, “Rank-and-file 
devotees to nonviolence were defecting in droves.”cliii Still, Gitlin wrote that even among those 
who showed, “The great majority of the demonstrators simply wanted to march and chant, to 
stand up and proverbially be counted; when the cops charged, gassed, smashed, they ran.”cliv 
What resulted was a display of police brutality against demonstrators few had anticipated in such 
severity. Gitlin writes that the Walker Report to the National Commission on the Causes and 
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Prevention of Violence concluded it was a “police riot.”clv Says Gitlin: “In brief, again and again, 
the police came down like avenging thugs. They charged, clubbed, gassed, and mauled—
demonstrators, bystanders, and reporters.”clvi Dirty-hands politicians in power showed that they 
could not be forced to listen, and they pushed to silence. It took two sides to fight an us versus 
them battle, and SDS was not solely responsible for such a mentality. In this way, moral 
absolutists—or those who directly challenge moral compromisers in power—can reveal the 
limitations of dirty-hands politicians’ willingness to debate and show that, when pushed to the 
edge, it may not be the moral absolutists who appear unreasonable or even undemocratic. 
 
Exposing Undemocratic, Unreasonable Tactics of Democratic, Reasonable Men 
 Walzer believes that moral absolutists, because of their certainty regarding specific moral 
issues, are therefore less democratic than moral compromisers, but he fails to recognize that if a 
culture of compromise is encouraged, maintained and unchallenged and morality shrinks from 
the discourse, dirty-hands politicians may reveal themselves—once they are challenged—as just 
as unwilling to negotiate—or share their power. Moral absolutists can still fight for democratic 
principles, as the SDS protestors showed. To be morally absolutist, after all, does not mean that 
one is morally absolute in every cause—nor does it preclude one from being morally 
uncompromising on democratic values. In doing so and directly confronting the compromisers in 
power, they can reveal how compromisers can often lose sight of democratic ideals. After all, 
one of the central reasons SDS was formed was in response to what students felt were the unmet 
democratic values and ideals which the older generation had preached but been too willing to 
compromise. 
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 SDS members frequently and vigorously asserted their support of democratic principles 
and called out the government for what they charged as its failure to live by them. Eric Mann 
wrote, “Our ideal is a democratically-run society in which the university is one of many useful 
and liberating institutions—not a haven for an elite.”clvii Oglesby commented, “If America began 
in earnest to practice the democratic act, those who now govern might not be government much 
longer.”clviii A SDS resolution passed in October of 1968 lamented, “Elections are a fraud 
because they foster the illusion that people have democratic power over the major institutions of 
society. In fact, jails, courts, schools, factories, the army, and the election process itself are 
controlled by a ruling class.”clix Tom Hayden set out to “shatter that façade of so-called 
democracy at the [Democratic National] Convention.”clx Following police violence against 
demonstrators at the Convention, on SDS member wrote, “The ‘democratic process’ is 
dead…We, the youth of America, in the tens of thousands, come here in our justified anger and 
are met at gunpoint.”clxi 
 Although as the movement became more radical many of its members expanded their 
critique to include not only the politicians in office but the system itself and its capitalist values, 
most SDS members still held on to their democratic ideals and insisted that the decisions made 
within the organization be made by a democratic process of deliberation. In a response to a 
proposed alteration to the SDS preamble that would drop the passage’s democratic vision, Chris 
Hobson of the University of Chicago SDS showed how even the more radical SDS members did 
not dismiss their democratic principles. He wrote, “Although stating an explicitly revolutionary 
perspective is a step forward for SDS, dropping the statement of democracy as the goal of 
struggle would constitute two steps back.”clxii He advocated “a statement of workers’ democracy 
as the goal of socialist struggle…[but not] the deletion of democracy as a goal.”clxiii This 
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tendency among even the most radical individuals to maintain their democratic commitment was 
also illustrated in a call for support from SDS member Rich Rothstein. He wrote, “And if 
radicals are those who believe passionately in the democratic and revolutionary potential of the 
common man, it is here that they must search out him and his potential.”clxiv It was revolution, or 
at least revolutionary rhetoric, in the name of democracy. 
 SDS members continued to criticize political actors for failing to live by the democratic 
ideals they preached. One wrote, “This is not the America we read about in school, where we 
were taught about the democratic process and the American way.”clxv One SDSer feared that 
President Johnson’s militant response to an incident in North Korea might result in “the erosion 
and destruction of any remaining vestiges of democratic control by the American people.”clxvi It 
was not democracy that was at fault for the problems of the country, but rather an elite group of 
individuals who had distorted its message. Wrote one SDS member, “Consequently, this analysis 
assumes that for democratic control in the university to be meaningful the general society must 
be substantially changed.”clxvii Often, they charged the government with infringing on their 
democratic rights; a note from leading civil rights activists published in NLN read that “the 
Government has begun a serious and systematic attempt at repression of the anti-war, black 
liberation, and student movements. Inherent in these attacks is a threat to the democratic rights of 
every American citizen.”clxviii  
  SDS often charged leading politicians like Daley and Wallace with preventing peaceful, 
democratic protest. Responding to an incident at Texas South University that led to the arrest of 
five black militants, a release from Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee printed in NLN 
warned: “The freedom of all of us is involved in the TSU case. It signifies an obvious attempt by 
the power structure to stifle and crush social protest…If we stand together, we may be able to 
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stop them. Otherwise there is little hope for democracy and justice in this country.”clxix  Dirty-
hands politicians might use democratic rhetoric, but SDS argued that in reality they were not 
committed to its principles and rules. 
 
A Willingness to Sacrifice As an Essential Ingredient in a Social Movement 
 If SDS radicals did not succeed in their goals, part of the problem may have been that 
they were not absolutist—or radical—enough. If an individual believes absolutely that he is right 
and has a firm commitment to his cause, then he is more likely to make sacrifices, perhaps 
irrational ones, in order to see that cause achieved. A revolutionary struggle requires sacrifice, 
and as David Barber posits in A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed, SDS members may 
have been too reluctant to renounce their privileges—or to back up their critique of society’s 
supposed moral corruption. Barber takes one side of a debate that raged within SDS in 1968 and 
early 1969 when he argues “that white students failed to see themselves as authentic agents of 
change because of their whiteness, their white privilege.”clxx  
 According to Barber, SDS and the New Left failed, and it failed because its members 
were not willing to address or give up their male, white, and mostly middle-class elite status. He 
writes, “The New Left failed because it ultimately came to reflect the dominant white culture’s 
understandings of race, gender, class, and nation.”clxxi Barber argues that SDS was a male-
dominated organization that gave little credence or voice to women’s concerns. He asserts that 
SDS failed to “transcend the gendered norms of the society it was supposedly in revolt 
against.”clxxii He writes of the unequal power dynamic: “While men were arguing and making 
grand theory and policy, women did what at the time was called ‘shit work’—[women] made the 
coffee, typed the letters, ran the officer, cooked the food, and kept the men satisfied.”clxxiii  
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Women, if they achieved any status within the organization, “attained it through their connection 
to men.”clxxiv According to Barber, when approached about oppressive gender norms within the 
organization, male SDS members would preach patience. At this time gender just wasn’t one of 
“the movement’s main priorities.”clxxv 
 According to Barber, SDS members didn’t back up their critical analysis of society with 
regard to race, either. They might articulate a stance of racial equality, but when it came down to 
it, their actions and views were more in line with those of the greater society to which they 
claimed to be opposed. They weren’t willing to give up enough to ensure that their vision would 
be realized. Barber writes, “More often than not, SDSers took the black movement’s style over 
its substance and interpreted the movement’s main demands on white activists in ways that left 
white racial identity intact, if somewhat discomforted.”clxxvi SDS members failed to look within 
and to white communities to interrogate their own racial identity and what it meant. Barber 
argues “that New Leftists long understood racism as only affecting black people and 
disconnected racism from their own experience.”clxxvii White people were the norm, and it was 
black people who in their vision would be integrated—integration was the goal, not changing the 
white people with whom blacks were to be assimilated. Barber writes, “They were not the 
racialized ones; they were part of the American mainstream; they were normal.”clxxviii  As a result, 
Barber claims, “The majority of New Leftists failed to appreciate Black Power’s imperative for 
antiracist organizing in the white community.”clxxix Viewing racism as only a black problem, they 
did not recognize the significance of the Black Power movement or accede to black leaders’ 
demands to organize within their own communities.  
 Barber says that inherent in this refusal to take the Black Power movement as seriously as 
they should have was a sense among SDS members, rooted in their white privilege, that they 
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would be the movers and leaders of a social movement whose aims were greater than those of 
any one of its segments, of which they viewed the Black Power movement as one. He comments, 
“Still, a more important obstacle stood in the way of SDS’s ability to appreciate Black Power’s 
significance to white activists: SDS members’ long-held belief that SDS stood as the center of 
social change in the United States.”clxxx Barber criticizes SDS for what he sees as its “division of 
labor in the struggle for social change. Black people and the civil rights movement would be 
responsible for the struggle against racism—apparently a black problem—and would be a single 
element in the SDS’s radical coalition. SDS would be responsible for everything else.”clxxxi Like 
gender, race was secondary to the ‘“more important’ class struggle.”clxxxii  SDS members might 
be inspired by black militancy, but they would appropriate it for their own, white concerns. 
Barber writes that the SDS movement’s “imitation of black assertiveness acknowledged the 
strength of the black movement, but in a fashion designed not to enhance that strength but to use 
that power to address its own immediate, white, concerns.”clxxxiii He asserts that SDS minimized 
the significance of Black Power and its leaders because SDS members failed to address and 
sacrifice the racial privilege that they had inherited from the system they claimed they wanted to 
bring down. 
 Barber argues that SDS’s failure to address its own privilege and make the sacrifices 
necessary for radical change was also apparent in the group’s attitudes toward issues of social 
class and foreign policy. Barber argues that SDS followed the Old Left claim that class trumped 
race, and that the black man’s “real enemy was the greedy exploiter, or the labor aristocrat, and 
not the average white worker.”clxxxiv Again Barber argues that this signals that SDS was not 
radical enough, for it failed to challenge “white working-class racism.”clxxxv Doing so would have 
been difficult and daring but by not doing so, Barber argues, SDS failed to live up to its critique 
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of entrenched liberals and greater society’s moral failure. And just as SDS members allowed 
themselves to attack racism without holding themselves personally accountable or 
acknowledging their own racial identity, SDS “by and large saw imperialism as something 
external to the United States, as what the United States did abroad, and not something that 
wholly shaped the internal life of the country.”clxxxvi  
 And so, in Barber’s mind, SDS failed, “not because it was too radical…but because it 
was not radical enough.”clxxxvii  It had failed to live up to its critique, instead coming to “to mirror 
that mainstream, and…traditional American racial attitudes.”clxxxviii  When SDS collapsed in 
1969, its goals had not been realized: there were the same institutions and the same politicians 
running them. SDS had revealed its unwillingness to renounce its privileged societal status in its 
members’ insistence that they were the movers for social change, not the oppressed individuals 
in whose name they claimed to speak. Barber writes, “They could not be the humble foot soldiers 
of a revolution, but had to take the privileged position that was their birthright as young white 
people—and this in the name of combating that very privilege.”clxxxix The historical moment had, 
in Barber’s mind, asked privileged youth to look within and evaluate how they were complicit in 
the system’s failings, and to try and change themselves and people like them for the better; it was 
to help, and not lead, America’s oppressed. SDS in the 1960s was “the story of young white 
people’s struggle to understand that they were not a specially favored people destined to free 
humanity, a struggle to be humble in the face of the great historical drama unfolding before 
them.”cxc   
 Barber’s claims are just that—and they should not be taken uncritically as fact. In 
particular, he skimps over many of the more negative aspects of radicalism, and he doesn’t 
acknowledge the extent to which many SDS members debated the very points that he makes, 
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instead painting a picture in which SDS was woefully unaware of the contradictions he points 
out. In fact, debates recorded in NLN suggest that many SDS members were urging that New 
Leftists make the types of sacrifices that their critique demanded.  
 SDS members often attempted to persuade other members to sacrifice their privileges for 
the New Left cause. Mike Klonsky, the SDS National Secretary, wrote, “We must attack 
repression with solidarity. This means rejecting white-skin privilege and raising demands and 
struggles for the most oppressed sectors first.”cxci A piece from Les Coleman took a hopeful tone, 
“We indict the universities…At the schools we are rejecting the false privileges—the stupid 
privileges—they have offered.”cxcii Mark Kleiman wrote a peace in which he tried to convince 
radical high school students not to go to college. He wrote that they should do so even if “going 
to school is easier than getting a job.”cxciii 
 Whether these pleas worked is another question, but the fact that some SDS members—
perhaps a core that was, in fact, willing to make the sacrifices they asked of others—were aware 
that too many in their ranks were unwilling to forgo the privileges society provided them, and 
which they were attacking at least in rhetoric, is undeniable. SDS was unhappy to find the 
Marquette protest ended “when Marquette basketball coach McGuire met with his six athletes, 
and…convinced them that they jeopardized…their careers.”cxciv Faced with the potential reality 
that their actions would have financial consequences, the athletes dropped their demonstration. 
Klonsky recapped another scenario that characterized the lack of willingness to sacrifice. 
 While support of the black liberation struggle at Valley State was good, there was 
a void in the struggle because there was never an attack against white supremacy 
and the white-skin-privileged position of students at the school. A situation 
occurred where many white students were willing to get arrested in support of 
blacks, but were not willing to miss examinations so a strike could be called 
because failing or missing an examination would challenge the whole privileged 
position which white students are placed in.cxcv 
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  Some SDS members concluded optimistically that the group’s increased militancy was a 
signal that more members were willing to challenge their privileged status. One SDSer wrote that 
confrontations with police at University of California-Berkeley indicated “that the movement has 
entered a new stage. The fact that pigs will actually shoot us, like they have been shooting our 
black and brown brothers for so long.”cxcvi This was a good sign, the author suggested, a signal of 
“the beginning of the loss of at least one part of our white skin privileges.”cxcvii It also signaled to 
the author, as it might to Barber, that it was time for SDS to get more radical. It was time, the 
author argued, “to pick up the gun.”cxcviii  Civil rights leader James Forman wrote in to NLN, “Our 
commitment to resist must grow greater and greater.”cxcix And as one SDS member reminded, the 
strongest commitment and show of sacrifice did not always have to be violent: “It’s easier to 
shoot a gun than to be willing to be beaten by a police nightstick.”cc 
Other SDS members tried to appeal to the working class and to do so on the basis of 
shared oppression—and in the hopes of forming a coalition. They insisted that the new exposure 
of the university as an oppressive institution leveled the playing field—and showed that the 
middle-class, educated students of SDS were not as privileged as they had once been, or as 
people supposed. The editors wrote in a NLN piece in June 1968, “We know that we are 
oppressed. The university channels us into the meaningless survival offered in a society of 
boring, fruitless employment…We are oppressed in different ways.”cci They continued, “We 
must link our struggles with those of the industrial working class, with black people, and with the 
much-oppressed under-employed and unemployed poor in this country.”ccii And they urged a 
certain degree of absolutism: “In no case should we ever submerge our anti-racist, anti-
imperialist politics to gain popular support.”cciii  
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Still others focused more specifically on the Draft. The National Council (NC) included 
this appeal as a goal for members in 1968. Naimi Jaffe, John Fuerst, and Bob Gottlieb wrote the 
appeal on behalf of the NC, starting off the piece arguing for strategies whose end should be the 
“formation of links with non students.”cciv They identified the Draft as an issue on which both 
sides could connect, and tried to compare their oppression to that of working-class and non-
student populations: “The draft cuts through the fragmentation that divides students from non-
students. The privileged status implied by the student deferment is being eroded by the new draft 
law. The military and university are parallel institutions…both coerce individuals into the roles 
required to maintain a repressive system.”ccv The Draft impacts us too, they cried; our privileges 
are also being lost. Of course, even in this case, the students themselves were not choosing to 
give up their privilege—it had been taken away from them, and the cynic might say that if it 
were reinstated they would stop complaining. Also, their attempt to equalize their oppression to 
that of the working class does not acknowledge how the oppression was different for each group 
and had different costs. 
 And there were cynics, even within SDS: Not everyone was so optimistic about the 
potential of SDS members to sacrifice their privilege for the organization’s cause. Carol Schik 
wrote to NLN from Tennessee that “you guys don’t have time to frick around trying to radicalize 
middle-class white students.”ccvi She went on the question the commitment of these students: 
“Sure, some of them will risk getting their heads bashed in demonstrations…But when the shit 
comes down, do you really think any substantial number of these kids will choose to fight in the 
Revolution rather than retreat to their middle-class security?”ccvii There might be some who were 
willing to sacrifice their privilege but, Schik wrote in, “there are just not enough of them with the 
potential for…action and long-term commitment.”ccviii  
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 Clearly, however, the question was being debated more than Barber acknowledged, and 
some SDS members recognized the need for a more radical commitment to SDS causes. 
Similarly, although the majority of the organization may have failed to do so, there were also 
members in SDS who noted, as Barber does, that white working-class racism was a problem that 
needed to be dealt with. In an article titled “Learn the Lessons of US History,” Noel Ignatin 
shared his reading of the historical background of white working-class racism. He first 
establishes that there was such racism and states, “I don’t believe it is possible to build coalitions 
of black and white on the basis of the self-interest of each, if the self-interest of the whites means 
the maintenance of white supremacy and the white-skin privilege.”ccix He makes the same 
argument that Barber makes: whites would have to face their own racism, and the racism of the 
white working class, if they hoped for a coalition with the Black Power movement.  
 Ignatin argues that working-class whites had been given skin-based privilege by a 
wealthy elite that knew it needed to strike a deal in order to buffer against potential rebellion, and 
he asserts that before a coalition is possible, it will be necessary for whites to renounce their 
white privilege. He wrote, “In the three great eras of struggle I have cited, probably the three 
greatest in post-Civil War history, in the final analysis the matter came down to this: the power 
structure was able to solve its problems with the white workers ‘within the family’, by offering 
them privileges.”ccx White workers made a deal—they morally compromised—throughout 
history and Ignatin demands that all whites, working-class or not, move toward moral absolutism 
on the issue of racial equality, and that their actions mirror their beliefs and rhetoric—that they 
renounce their privilege. He continued, “Solidarity between black and white requires more from 
the white than a willingness to ‘help the Negroes up if it doesn’t lower us any’. It requires a 
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willingness to renounce our privileges, precisely to ‘lower ourselves’ in order that we can all rise 
up together.”ccxi 
 So Ignatin acknowledges what Barber says SDS did not, though Ignatin notes that “in 
discussing my thesis with movement people, I have sometimes encountered the objection that my 
approach is a moralistic rather than a materialistic one, that it relies on idealism rather than ‘self-
interest.’”ccxii The moralistic argument required real sacrifice from its adherents, but I, like 
Barber, might argue that this is exactly what a social movement with high aspirations and 
demands for change—and the knowledge that this change will have to be forced on the system, 
and not, as Dovi envisions, incorporated by understanding dirty-hands politicians—needs: more 
sacrifice and enough moral absolutists (a category that, when the motivation of a movement is 
moralistic, often overlaps with those lumped together as ‘radicals’) to drive it.    
 Barber’s claim that SDS unequivocally failed should, like his implicit claim that the 
issues he brings up were rarely discussed among SDS, also be challenged—I, like Todd Gitlin 
believe that, despite SDS’s failure to bring about more fundamental changes, the group 
succeeded, through its direct opposition to dirty-hands politicians and a system that over-
emphasized consensus and rationality, to bring morality back into politics and open up the 
possible range of political perspectives. I second Gitlin when he makes the former argument; he 
writes that “the changes wrought by the Sixties, however beleaguered, averted some of the worst 
abuses of power.”ccxiii And the latter point: “Say what we will about the Sixties’ failures, limits, 
disasters, America’s political and cultural space would probably not have opened up as much as 
it did without the movement’s divine delirium.”ccxiv 
 And yet Gitlin acknowledges that “a generation giddy about easy victories was too easily 
crushed by defeats, too handily placated…by private satisfactions.”ccxv He notes, “As the antiwar 
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movement subsided, many students found it an opportune moment to trade in their activism for a 
ticket to the less risky, more pleasurable counterculture.”ccxvi He writes: “In the early Seventies, 
the journey to the interior preoccupied a good half of my old movement friends.”ccxvii New Left 
activism disappeared as SDS crumbled to factionalism in 1969; national economic troubles 
plagued the country; the antiwar movement ended with the Draft in 1973; and the Black Power 
movement no longer captivated the nation’s attention. Had SDS members lacked a certain 
absolutist commitment to their cause? Did they lose their activist mentality because their 
economic privilege had been threatened? Did their willingness to drop their cause show, as 
Barber argues, that their shortcomings were due to their not being radical enough? Gitlin’s 
description of the New Left’s decline gives these questions some import.  
 The political and spiritual contraction was matched—partly caused, partly 
reinforced—by the end of the great economic boom of 1945-73…With the cost of 
housing booming, the young could no longer assume that in the natural course of 
things they were going to live more grandly than their parents…When 
postgraduate employment could no longer be taken for granted, life in the margins 
lost much of its glamour…There was no war to galvanize opposition, no 
compelling black movement to inspire white conscience. Imperceptibly, the 
Sixties slid into the Seventies, and the zeitgeist settled down.ccxviii  
 
  It appears that this passage gives credence to Barber’s argument, for it suggests that SDS 
members were limited by their unwillingness to fully commit to their cause, or make the 
sacrifices necessary to reach the ends for which they hoped. Gitlin reflects, “The New Left’s 
torment…was that relatively privileged people were fighting on behalf of the oppressed.”ccxix 
Once they emerged from the movement’s excitement and found that their privileges might be 
threatened, for many members, their activism ended. 
 
Reinforcing Moral Conviction 
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  Any oppositional social movement that faces a system with coercive power needs 
individuals who are willing to make real, hard sacrifices in the fight for their cause. Even if such 
individuals only form a small core, they can motivate others on the margins to make their own, 
smaller sacrifices that otherwise they might not have been willing to make. The heat radiates to 
the outer circles. Dovi imagines that moral absolutists might reaffirm the commitment of the 
general populace to morality, and we have already seen how SDS absolutists helped reintroduce 
moral questions into politics. When the risks are higher, as they typically are in oppositional 
social movements, this contribution becomes even more central. A strong sense of moral 
conviction is necessary for moralistic social actors and fringe members of a social movement to 
meet their potential. From moral conviction comes a willingness to sacrifice. Barber identifies a 
lack of commitment to sacrifice and radicalism among SDS members; by doing so, he may also 
be arguing that there weren’t enough moral absolutists to shore up members’ moral conviction, 
either. 
  SDS members at times pointed to a fear among some members to take responsibility for 
the movement—and express the necessary moral conviction—as a hindrance to its development. 
Carl Oglesby attacked young liberals for not joining SDS, asserting that their refusal was rooted 
in fear. He identified what he felt was their “fear of honest thought and its political imperatives; 
of effecting a clean break with the powerful institutions which have squandered so many lives; of 
abandoning the security of the system whose outrages you attack; of becoming your own ‘base 
of legitimacy.’”ccxx He argued that the odds were against them, but that to recognize the uphill 
battle in front of them—to not be completely firm in their conviction—was not the right 
response. He responded to this notion by expressing his own firm conviction: ““That cannot 
happen.’ Perhaps that is true. But since it must happen, it will, and whether it can or not makes 
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no difference.”ccxxi Bill Ayers identified defeatism as a problem in a speech he gave in September 
1969, a month before the collapse of SDS. Ayers said, “We have to deal WITH THE FACT 
THAT in a lot of ways all of us have elements of defeatism in us, and don’t believe really that 
we can win, don’t really believe that the United States can be beaten.”ccxxii Was there a need for 
more moral absolutists, who perhaps irrationally believed that their change would come to 
fruition?  
  Members worried, it seems correctly in retrospect, that there weren’t enough firmly 
devoted SDS members to fight the necessary fight. Mark Kleiman’s question—“We are either 
serious about changing things in this country so that we may be free…or we are not—”ccxxiii  was 
a real one, and there were indications that for many members, the answer was no—they were not 
serious. In another piece in which he asked members to stop smoking dope and get serious, 
Kleiman stated: “If we are committed, we must recognize the responsibility that entails, and 
begin to live with it.”ccxxiv Earlier in 1968, a piece by Cathy Wilkerson got at these same 
questions of fear, responsibility and moral conviction. She urged members to become more 
committed. She wrote, “In the past, we have been confused and defensive about explicitly stating 
that, yes, we are for a change that will affect the roots of our society…If we are to take ourselves 
and our discontent seriously, we must take the responsibility for thinking out the consequences 
of our ideas, for to toy with men’s lives is to negate the content of our values.”ccxxv She asked 
that “we become unafraid to feel the full import of being free human beings…[and insisted] that 
responsibility will become the means to living the kind of lives we have yearned for.”ccxxvi 
  If there were individuals like Wilkerson and Oglesby who preached this conviction and 
acceptance of responsibility—and others who acted on it, some of whom I will detail below—
maybe there weren’t enough of them for their commitment to ripple outward. Undoubtedly, there 
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were some SDS absolutists who claimed their conviction was so strong that they were willing to 
die in their fight. Mark Rudd, SDS National Secretary, separated himself from the revisionist, 
calling himself the revolutionary. The revisionist is willing to “do just what the bourgeoisie 
wants, to stop fighting…is a person who believes he can live forever, who wants a painless, 
riskless way to the revolution.”ccxxvii  A revolutionary, on the other hand, has the resolve “to fight 
harder...running risks, suffering casualties…A revolutionary, like anyone else, will not live 
forever. At this stage, he will win or die fighting for the people of the world.”ccxxviii  A speech 
given at Malcolm X’s memorial service and reprinted in NLN promised the same type of 
commitment. It stated, matter-of-factly, “Many of us will go to jail; others will be killed.”ccxxix 
  Some SDS members managed to show their conviction—and inspire others in the 
movement—without the use of violence. There were a number of hunger strikes taken by SDS 
members to protest their imprisonment and display the strength of their spirit. An eighteen year-
old women arrested for protesting in Cincinnati, Ohio “refused to co-operate with the courts in 
any way.”ccxxx NLN recounted her stand in jail: “She has been fasting since entering the 
workhouse, and at this time the doctors are fearing that she may have already done irreparable 
damage to her brain.”ccxxxi Asked why she was fasting, she simply replied, ‘“Only in that way 
can I maintain my inner freedom.’”ccxxxii   
  In another case, it was reported, “All nine people—seven men and two women—who 
burned Draft files with napalm at Local Draft Board 33 in Catonsville, Maryland (Baltimore 
County) on Friday, May 17th are continuing their fast in the Baltimore County Jail in 
Towson.”ccxxxiii  The strikers “requested that the money that would have been used to pay for their 
food be turned over to the Poor People’s Campaign in Washington.”ccxxxiv Although the actions 
of moral absolutists can often appear irrational and contrary to the actors’ immediate self-
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interest, they can inspire others—perhaps because in displaying that very irrationality, they are 
also showing their strong moral conviction to a cause. 
  A SDS NLN contributor recognized this benefit of moral absolutists when he addressed 
the shooting by Chicago cops of Dean Johnson—who had shot at the cops first—in September of 
1968. The contributor wrote: “People say it was stupid for him to fire at the cop. Maybe it was, 
stupid—but courageous. A lot of us aren’t as stupid. We aren’t as courageous, either.”ccxxxv NLN 
quoted Malcolm X on his birthday, roughly four years after his death: ‘“Power in defense of 
freedom is greater than power in behalf of tyranny and oppression, because real power comes 
from the conviction which produces action, uncompromising action. It also produces insurrection 
against oppression. The only way you end oppression is with power.”’ccxxxvi  At least some SDS 
members recognized that Malcolm X’s contribution was more than, as Dovi suggests, just 
making Martin Luther King, Jr. appear more reasonable—and argued that SDS was missing 
some of that moral conviction so important to a motivated and effective oppositional social 
movement. 
 
 Concluding Thoughts, and Looking Ahead to the Next Chapter 
  In this chapter, I have illustrated some of the benefits of powerful moral absolutists in 
opposition to dirty-hands politicians in power and explained how they improve the greater 
democracy; I also touched on their importance within an oppositional social movement. In the 
next chapter, I will advocate for a more conflict-heavy vision of democracy in which the benefits 
of confrontation and the delineation of lines and stances are promoted. 
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Chapter Three: The Value of Conflict and Confrontation, Led by 
SDS Absolutists   
 In chapter three I present SDS members’ arguments for a more conflict-heavy view of 
democracy than that of dirty-hands theorists, who above all else value consensus. The arguments 
I present and ultimately endorse, with a caveat that confrontation led by absolutists works best 
when it is followed by negotiations led by compromisers, values disagreements, even when they 
are between two uncompromising sides. I argue through SDS members that confrontational 
politics led by moral absolutists, as it must be because it requires such a high level of moral 
conviction and a strong willingness to sacrifice oneself for the cause, is important because it can 
delineate sides, as is sometimes necessary for democracy to progress; expose the system and its 
faults; and win the oppositional group its demands. I argue against the argument, made by Todd 
Gitlin and others, that SDS’s failures were the result of the organization’s absolutist and militant 
turn. I argue that although sides were delineated and the public largely chose the other side, there 
were a number of other historical factors that could be cited as responsible for the public’s 
choice—and I wonder aloud if absolutists are not blamed merely because they appear, because of 
their uncompromising stances, scary and undemocratic—when further consideration of their 
influence should be granted. 
When I argue for the benefits of moral absolutists at all, but especially in opposition to 
dirty-hands politicians in power, I am embracing a vision of democracy that recognizes the 
importance and value of—and doesn’t seek to force silent—conflict and discord. Consensus is, 
as most political theorists acknowledge, constructive, but it begins to lose its value as there is 
less and less to compromise on. If there is compromise—and I do not believe that there should or 
even can only be conflict, though it is important to have political consensus sometimes forcefully 
challenged—it is more meaningful when individuals find common ground despite the presence 
 60 
of real differences and disagreements—about which each side is passionate.ccxxxvii  Doing so 
affirms the strength of the bonds between the parties: each makes a sacrifice because it 
recognizes the legitimacy of the other’s claims or the system in which the parties operate; at the 
very least, each sees the value in coming to some sort of agreement—a sign of respect for the 
opposing party. For these individuals who ultimately compromise to be passionate about these 
issues—and, in certain cases, for them to be willing to compromise on them—they need to know 
that there are moral absolutists who will never do the same. These absolutists show through their 
actions and rhetoric that the issues have real import—that they really do matter, that people 
should feel passionately about them. Compromisers need to know that the fight will continue 
despite their compromise, that others will stick to the cause and continue to push for it. 
Absolutists enable individuals to be able to make meaningful compromise.  
 And there are times when certain issues should, because of their moral seriousness and 
because they are of direct importance to individuals, divide people. There are issues that are so 
morally compelling that they should force us to pick a side—and maybe even fight for it. The 
question of slavery in the United States, for example, was a real and disturbing one over which 
the bloody Civil War would be each side’s only answer. There is a benefit to, when issues come 
up about which you feel compelled to act, declaring which side you are on and confronting the 
other side’s claims and arguments. People need to be challenged to explain their stances; if they 
are not, but their opinions are law, they might never feel the need to do so, and policies and 
actions that should be questioned will be taken as fact. Absolutists are especially important, then, 
when they play a directly antagonistic role to politicians in power. Often without a direct 
challenge these politicians are unwilling to consider moral questions, or to even explain their 
reasoning behind decisions that are of real significance to the people who are affected.  
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 Often it is only unreasonable, irrational moral absolutists driven by their conviction who 
will lead the challenge against stronger, entrenched political actors. This confrontation is 
essential, because it can force those actors to consider moral questions; explain their decisions; 
and it can expose their inconsistencies between rhetoric and action. As showed in the last 
chapter, for example, it is through confrontation that ‘reasonable’, democratic men can be shown 
to act unreasonably, undemocratically, and irresponsibly. It is through confrontation that these 
actors can be held accountable and forced to live more clearly by their recited values and 
beliefs—or even to change those values and beliefs so that they are more in line with the wishes 
of the people. It is through a policy of confrontation and negotiation that SDS would have been 
most successful in its aims, and this strategy would have required a significant contribution from 
motivated moral absolutists. 
 It is through confrontation, typically led by individuals absolutely committed to a cause 
and willing to sacrifice for it, that the issues of such importance to these individuals and the lines 
they view as so vital and immovable, can be exposed to a public that otherwise might not have 
been aware of—or were unwilling to address—these questions. By confronting government 
directly, moral absolutists can clearly delineate those lines and either build support behind them 
or, if the public chooses the other side, adjust their own strategies, or even the stances that they 
had viewed as uncompromisable.  
 In 1968 and 1969, there were many debates within SDS over which tactics would bring 
the movement the most success—both immediate and sustained. Most pronounced were those 
debates between PL, which would in 1968 get booted from SDS, and members of SDS. PL 
members argued for a base-building approach and preached patience. They viewed increased 
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militancy and confrontation skeptically, and they preferred to focus on building a coalition with 
the working class before escalating conflicts with the government and police forces.  
 The debates within chapters were frequent, and the two sides often failed to come to 
agreement. In November of 1968 New Left Notes ran an article on a split that occurred within 
Ann Arbor’s SDS, and they included a note explaining why: “We are running this long story 
because we see the situation at Ann Arbor as typical of many SDS chapters throughout the 
country.”ccxxxviii  The unresolved question centered on the use of confrontational politics. Terry 
Robbins and Bill Ayers had written one month earlier: “What is clear, however, is that the Ann 
Arbor chapter is struggling with the most important issue facing the Movement today: that of the 
use of confrontation and aggressive politics in building a revolutionary consciousness.”ccxxxix  In 
the November piece, they would counter the common PL argument, writing, “Confrontation, we 
argued, is a way of building a base.”ccxl Could confrontation attract support, or would it alienate 
potential backers of the movement? 
 
Arguments Within the SDS Movement Against Confrontational Politics  
 There were many individuals—not limited to PL—who argued that confrontational 
politics could have negative consequences for the movement. One NLN article noted “we have 
moved to direct confrontations with the war machine and with the cops.”ccxli While the authors 
recognized that “such militant tactics are a great advance over impotent dissent,”ccxlii they feared 
that they “simply do not go far enough.”ccxliii  First of all, they wrote that such tactics “do not 
enable us to confront the real power structure of the US.”ccxliv Confrontations were usually 
between demonstrators and the coercive arm—the police—of the government, not with the 
government and its policymakers. Secondly, the writers feared that confrontational politics “do 
 63 
very little to help us organize and radicalize non-political people; they do little to help us in our 
task of building a mass radical movement.”ccxlv In their minds, confrontation was better than not 
acting at all, but it did not challenge the individuals it needed to; attract enough public support; 
or help build a strong base from which a powerful movement could emerge.ccxlvi   
 A significant segment of SDS made this argument: that confrontation could be useful, but 
not right now—that it was first necessary to build a base of public support that would participate 
in and by galvanized by such demonstrations. A number of authors wrote in a February 1968 
NLN article, “the concept of ‘resistance’ with no strategy for victory is just another version of the 
pacifist, moral witness concept…The whole concept of the present string of ‘resistance’ 
demonstrations must lead to a series of tactical defeats.”ccxlvii  Before confrontation there had to 
be recruitment. The authors continued, “Where SDS chapters have applied a base-building 
approach, their confrontations have strengthened and broadened anti-imperialist forces. Where 
they have rushed headlong into super-militant demonstrations or sit-ins, without trying to win 
over or neutralize the masses of students, they have weakened and isolated themselves.”ccxlviii  In 
a separate piece, Eric Mann warned members not to “substitute militancy for constituency.”ccxlix 
Confrontation could be an effective political strategy, but only if there was support behind it. 
 What was needed now, these SDSers insisted, was patience. In April 1968, the NLN 
editors made a plea for organizing, and they identified members’ impatience as an obstacle. They 
wrote, “The Movement desperately needs organizers in neighborhoods at this time. Yet the 
present situation finds most campus-based radicals either critical of slow, in-depth organizing 
(‘it’s not where the action is at’).”ccl But the editors insisted that a short-term, militant- and 
demonstration-heavy approach to politics would not benefit the organization or lead to its goals 
being met. They asked for members, then, to make an effort to “comprehend the need for a long-
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range perspective.”ccli They advised that people try and help advance SDS goals from their 
professions—which they assumed members would move into before the organization’s plans 
could come to fruition. Rich Rothstein went so far as to write in a separate article that “the 
organization of the base for a popular American revolution may take 10, 20, or 30 years.”cclii 
Confrontation could work, but not for quite some time; the editors and Rothstein advised that 
members play the waiting game. 
 If they rushed ahead solely or primarily with militant actions, there was a fear among 
some SDS members that confrontational politics might scare off potential supporters and delay 
or derail the base-building project. Eric Mann worried about that SDS was not projecting the 
warmth and humanity that he knew was present and integral to the organization. He wrote, 
“Since we are not in power, we often assume an aggressive, hostile style in many of our actions. 
While this is necessary at times, it often creates the impression that radicals are humorless, even 
insensitive people.”ccliii He suggested confrontation continue—acknowledging that “there are 
certain situations in which such confrontations are politically valuable—” but pushed for the 
movement to act in other ways as well, so as to project a more welcoming environment that 
might attract more public support.ccliv Mann worried that disorganized, individual, bloody and 
violent confrontations would become the face of the organization; he urged that “resistance 
shouldn’t be defined as a series of sporadic, militant demonstrations…[but] a total political 
style.”cclv He wanted more programs, and he also suggested that compromising could be the right 
choice in certain circumstances. He wrote, “In some situations, by taking the programmatic 
initiative and developing alliances with liberal student-government types and liberal faculty 
members, we can win our demands.”cclvi Mann feared that too much of an emphasis on 
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confrontation might limit the movement’s ability to act and, by making it appear less palatable to 
the public, lead the movement toward isolation. 
 If all the public saw was SDS in bloody disputes with officers, members like Mann feared 
that the vast majority would side with the enemy. Mark Spiegel and Jeff Jones wrote that a 
violent confrontation at the Democratic National Convention would lead the public to do just 
that: “The main problem we see is the high potential for playing right into Johnson’s hands, 
permitting him to more easily declare us the enemy of the American people and more easily 
repress us.”cclvii People were unlikely to draw positive conclusions from images of violence, 
especially when those in charge—according to SDS—spun events to make it look like protestors 
were in the wrong. Spiegel and Jones urged SDS to take a long-term approach to planning and to 
make sure that members weren’t giving the police an opportunity to seize on confrontation to 
justify to the public cracking down more violently on protestors in the future. They wrote, “Last 
summer the Chicago cops came down heavy on the organizing protests, and this summer we may 
be giving them an excuse to finish the job.”cclviii Spiegel and Jones, then, based their opposition 
to confrontation in the argument that violent confrontation would harm the organization’s long-
term goals. 
 Even if SDS members remained committed to non-violent principles in theory, some 
members feared—especially in reference to the Democratic National Convention—that 
considering the other side’s aggressive preparation for and response to protests, non-violent 
confrontation would be impossible. Spiegel and Jones wrote in that March 4, 1968 edition of 
NLN—months before the August Convention—that non-violent confrontation was not a realistic 
option, because of the other side: “Next, to envision non-violent demonstrations at the 
Convention is the indulge in pleasant fantasizing. It should be clear to anyone who has been 
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following developments in Chicago that a non-violent demonstration would be impossible. We 
would suggest that [President Lyndon] Johnson expects violence at this year’s Convention.”cclix 
The idea of confrontation might be appealing, especially if the goal was to protest non-violently, 
but SDS members feared that they would not be allowed to confront the system in the way they 
wanted. 
 Some SDS members feared that a move toward militancy and violent confrontation 
would not only be harmful for public relations, but might also lead the organization away from 
its founding principles, once expressed in democratic and non-violent terms. The uncited author 
of one NLN piece criticized the idea that democratic practices within the organization would 
have to be put on hold if it hoped to succeed in its revolutionary goals. The author dismissed 
calls for the development of a disciplined cadre organization as an “excuse for authoritarian 
measures.”cclx The author also expressed a minority view within SDS by arguing that SDS 
militants were provoking the government, and not the other way around: “But a political strategy 
that attempts to provoke the government into arresting its people shouldn’t be called 
repressed.”cclxi In this author’s view, an insistence on militancy was really a move away from the 
organization’s core views, and if anything exposed SDS, and not the government, as being 
undemocratic. 
  
Arguments within the SDS Movement for Confrontational Politics  
 SDS members made a number of arguments in favor of confrontational politics, but they 
most often claimed that direct confrontation with the government, its police forces or any 
individuals who they viewed as emblematic of the country’s problems was beneficial because it 
helped to delineate sides and stances, both important because the public could see those sides and 
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potentially choose SDS over dirty-hands politicians and also because declaring themselves in 
opposition to and separate from the current system strengthened SDS members’ critique of that 
system in its entirety; exposed a government that was corrupted and undemocratic; showed dirty-
hands politicians that SDS meant business and increased SDS’s negotiating power to get its 
demands met; and because confrontation helped drive enthusiasm within the movement and 
attracted people to join and get involved. Most of these advocates expressed a desire to engage in 
non-violent militant confrontation, but as violence between protestors and police in 1968 became 
more common, many of them at least recognized that the confrontations they were supporting 
and calling for would involve some violence. 
 
Delineating Sides 
 Some SDS members argued that confrontation with moral compromisers in power could 
help clarify to the public how their political stances were different from the ones held by those 
politicians. The editors of one NLN issue wrote, “And you’re either on one side or the other. The 
people who want freedom are all on one side. The pigs of the world are on the other.”cclxii The 
pigs of the world included anyone who didn’t hold SDS’s views—but one goal in particular was 
to make clear that SDS was not a liberal organization. The University of Chicago SDS explained 
one such effort: “We decided that what was needed was a dramatic confrontation, before 
thousands of people, between liberals working for McCarthy and Kennedy, and radicals.”cclxiii 
SDS did not want to be misunderstood as part of the liberal establishment they aimed to criticize. 
Hari Dillon of the San Francisco State SDS summarized many peoples’ feelings when she wrote 
in NLN, “Liberalism is a deceptive diversionary strategy used to co-opt many honest individuals 
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and groups into supporting the status quo.”cclxiv SDS did not want to be associated with 
liberalism, as members felt that liberals were largely the problem. 
SDS wanted to provide an alternative, and they wanted people to know that they were 
doing so. Mark Spiegel wrote, “Thus, our response must be prepared to meet [the system] on all 
levels with alternate values.”cclxv The authors of one article, who would actually go on to say that 
an effort should be made to avoid a violent confrontation at the Democratic National Convention 
in Chicago, still argued that “the general strategy which leads to confrontation with the DNC [is] 
a good one; that in the face of the Convention we should stand clearly to declare which side we 
are on and to project that stance to the American people.”cclxvi SDS wanted to make clear that 
they offered an alternative to the liberal establishment: confronting that establishment was the 
strongest way to make that opposition clear. 
 SDS members felt that the Vietnam War and the Black Power movement, along with a 
political system they viewed as corrupted, were black-and-white issues of great moral import, 
and they felt that everyone should feel as strongly and take a side—specifically, theirs. They 
wanted to make clear which side they were on, and to show that the politicians in office were 
acting immorally—that being reasonable and compromising really meant ignoring and violating 
moral principles. SDSer Les Coleman wrote about the university system, “Make it clear. We are 
taking our stand against universities.”cclxvii  It was ‘us’ or ‘them’—and Coleman wanted to 
announce to the public that SDS not only opposed ‘them’ but also provided an alternative. He 
wrote, “We understand that an educational system functions to maintain the values of the society 
(the values that maintain the society itself.) But they are not our values, brothers and sisters. And 
it’s ours against theirs.”cclxviii  The time to waver had ended; there could be no compromise. He 
asked: “Are you with us—or with them?”cclxix 
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 The goal was to force people to choose a side: SDS felt that on issues of civil rights and 
the Vietnam War, there should be no compromise; it was our side or theirs. SDS members 
famously called for militant student takeovers like the one at Columbia University, when 
students occupied five buildings on the University’s campus to protest what they saw as 
Columbia’s “exploitation of the neighboring community and protecting US interests and 
exploitation of Third World countries.”cclxx One of the most publicized confrontations between 
SDS and police forces, many SDS members pointed to Columbia as a positive example of what 
could come from a strategy of confrontation against a more powerful foe. 
 In their minds, SDS benefitted from the clear delineation of sides that resulted from the 
confrontation. SDS members wrote, “We have won much—a whole student body polarized in 
our direction, exposure of the liberal façade in its true totalitarian form.”cclxxi They argued that 
direct confrontation had forced individuals to take sides: “By taking the buildings (especially 
[University President Grayson] Kirk’s office), we were putting our enemies up against the wall, 
forcing them to take sides.”cclxxii  They painted the confrontation as the only available recourse 
under what they claimed were oppressive and undemocratic circumstances. One member wrote:  
  The actions we took, occupying buildings, were the only ones available to us to 
win just demands. Nearly everyone—except, again, the administration—has 
admitted the justice of our demands. Some people object to the tactics we 
employed: we ‘should have used the ‘legitimate channels’’ to achieve our ends. 
There is a very simply answer in reply: we had exhausted all legitimate channels 
before we took the buildings.cclxxiii  
  
 The individual continued, “Since ‘legal means’ had been exhausted, and since there was 
no administration response to traditional civil-disobedience tactics, our only recourse was to take 
extra-legal actions to win our just demands.”cclxxiv The actions of the other side demanded 
militant confrontation, which had not been the first preference of SDS. SDS was prepared to act 
democratically, but they argued that the University had lost any right to make democratic claims. 
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The author wrote, “Since Columbia University exists by exploiting the oppressed of this country 
and the world, the administration is totally illegitimate.”cclxxv For those who so seriously doubted 
the democratic commitment of those in power, confronting them was not part of an effort to get 
them to listen to their pleas. The goal instead was to reveal to the public the dirty-hands leaders’ 
moral corruption and repressive tendencies, and by doing so win public support—and ultimately 
force those leaders from their positions.  
SDS members, then, did not necessarily expect or want an understanding response from 
the individuals they confronted. They wrote, “Given the threat to the ruling class represented by 
our tactics and our politics, immediate military repression, as in Vietnam and the ghettos, was the 
only answer.”cclxxvi Admitting that the University had no choice but to call in the police and 
respond violently to the student takeover, the protestors nevertheless saw value in the 
confrontation. NLN editors wrote, “Those in power cannot—often will not—concede any part of 
their power, rightly understanding that their power will fall according to the ‘domino theory’. 
They must respond with force.”cclxxvii  And so the goal was not, and these SDS members did not 
expect, compromise—what they wanted was surrender. A speech by ‘Brother Robert’ at 
Malcolm X’s memorial service found its way into NLN; it encouraged this all-or-nothing 
outlook. Brother Robert said, “They [the rulers, President Johnson] have begun to understand 
that we are their enemy, that for us to have our freedom means that they will have to give up 
their control, their ‘American way of life.’”cclxxviii  Confrontation could show the other side that 
you were serious—that for the chaos to end, what was required was their unconditional 
surrender.  
 For some, a confrontation like the one at Columbia was useful not only as a way to attract 
new members, but also because the commitment and militancy of activists on display there could 
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serve to inspire and motivate individuals who already identified as SDS members. Member 
Morgan Spector feared that the movement was “affected with a strange kind of malaise.”cclxxix 
Conflict and confrontation could energize the base; just watching people committed to a cause 
and willing to sacrifice for it might push you to do the same. Spector wrote, “We realized, 
though we never said as much, that the essential ingredient of our survival was conflict. As long 
as there was conflict, there would be a reason for us to act, and room for us to act.”cclxxx A later 
editorial pushing for more militancy made a similar argument, and the authors connected 
confrontation with a willingness among members of the base to act. It viewed Columbia and 
confrontations like it as a springboard for activism: “Last summer, picking up off the siege of 
Columbia, with the images of France fresh in our minds, was the first time that white kids got 
heavy into moving in the streets in a widespread way. Columbia showed us it was possible—
necessary—to take the offensive.”cclxxxi  After watching students put their privilege on the line, 
other members followed their lead, becoming more militant themselves. And so it was that many 
SDS members extolled confrontation, taking on the Columbia students’ chant: “‘One, 
two…many Columbias.’”cclxxxii  
 Only once people had chosen their side and, SDS hoped, committed to its causes, could 
action be taken against the establishment. One article introduced a sense of panic: the police 
were trying to take out Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) leader Rap Brown; 
it was time to make a move. The article continued: “A key question we must face, answer and 
ACT ON is clear: WHICH SIDE ARE WE ON?”cclxxxiii  The author imagined that clarity would 
lead to action and imbue fellow citizens with a commitment to the cause: “Will our silence insure 
that Rap and the black people of this country are imprisoned or killed? Or will our voices and 
actions make it crystal-clear in every part of this country that we are supporting our black 
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brothers in every way possible?”cclxxxiv  This fear of being silent and not letting the public know 
about SDS initiatives and goals was a common one. One member wrote more extremely, “We 
are excluded because we have refused to be good Germans.”cclxxxv  It was necessary to get out and 
speak up for your beliefs, and against those of the politicians in power; if you failed to do so, 
those complaints might never get aired and you would be witness to horrible injustices—in 
which you shared a hand because of your inaction. 
 Further, once the sides were clearly delineated, the argument went, SDS members and 
their public supporters could more accurately and effectively target the enemy. Stephen Lippman 
of high school SDS wrote longingly of the ability of striking workers at the Herald Examiner to 
do just that; he hoped SDS could learn from their example. Lippman wrote, “Unlike some of the 
so-called ‘Resistance’ we’ve seen, the workers knew who their enemy was and directed their 
attacks at Hearst, the scabs, and the cops—not innocent bystanders.”cclxxxvi  Further, Lippman 
implied that this certainty over which side they were on—and the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality 
that makes it easier to be completely morally committed to a cause and willing to sacrifice for 
it—allowed the workers to adopt the militant stance he felt SDS members were too reluctant to 
take. He admired of the strike, “And no one meekly submitted to police repression.”cclxxxvii  
Lippman felt this conviction was missing with SDS; he followed with a quote: “As 1 worker 
said, ‘We ain’t no Hippies!’”cclxxxviii  The certainty that came with knowing one’s side could 
inspire conviction and with it the sacrificial action necessary to spur the changes of which so 
many SDS members spoke.  
 As with many of its goals and initiatives, SDS derived some of its penchant for 
delineating sides via confrontation from the Black Power movement. Bernardine Dohrn, who 
would eventually become part of the extremist and violent Weatherman faction, looked to Huey 
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Newton, co-founder of the Black Panther Party, for guidance while she was still a member of 
SDS. Dohrn quoted Newton’s advice for white radicals in the July 29, 1968 issue of New Left 
Notes. In the passage, Newton asserts that action can only be taken once firm lines are drawn and 
the individual has chosen a side: “So the role of the mother country [white] radical, and he does 
have a role, is to first choose his friend and his enemy and after doing this…then to not only 
articulate his desires to regain his moral standard and realign himself with his humanity, but also 
to put this into practice by attacking the protectors of this institutions.”cclxxxix Only once the 
individual had chosen a side and committed could he make the type of sacrifices necessary for 
the movement’s success. 
 
Exposing the System 
 In the previous chapter I argued that moral absolutists can benefit democracy by holding 
dirty-hands politicians accountable—not only morally but also, when those absolutists are 
invested in democratic ideals, for failing to live up to—or for violating—democratic principles 
and practices. A common argument among those in favor of confrontational politics was that it 
was only through such direct challenges to their hold on power that dirty-hands politicians would 
explicitly reveal their true, undemocratic nature—and the undemocratic nature of the system that 
sustained them. Since it was not in the best interests of those in power for undemocratic practices 
to be exposed, the argument went, confrontation was necessary for such information to be 
released. 
 Tom Hayden argued that confrontation was a necessary SDS tactic in an interview with 
NLN just weeks before what would turn out to be a very large confrontation at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention. One of his central arguments hinged on exposure. He hoped 
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that confronting liberals non-violently and being violently repressed would “shatter that façade 
of so-called democracy at the Convention.”ccxc He felt that the public needed to see—and would 
see because of SDS confrontation—that the current democratic system did not allow for 
meaningful change. He commented, “We can organize demonstrations against the appearance of 
the candidates and show politically that none of the three major parties represent the opinion in 
the country…We can have an enormous number of arrests [later, on Election Day,] to again 
demonstrate that the whole political system is not working, is not operative.”ccxci Todd Gitlin 
wrote that Hayden hoped to expose “pseudo-democratic politics” by confronting the government 
and its coercive forces in Chicago.ccxcii  
Like Hayden, Mike Spiegel argued that the current political system and its actors did not 
act democratically and that there was no true democratic representation of the people’s interests. 
He said in a speech that “no candidate out of those parties can solve the basic, root problems of 
America, the solutions to which are founded on an opposition to the power of that ruling 
class.”ccxciii  He went on, “Finally, we must explain the electoral process and the two major parties 
as arms of the ruling class, and put forward the position that consequently there is no solution to 
the basic problems of this society which issues from those parties.”ccxciv They imagined that the 
violent repression of protestors would not only delineate SDS’s stances from those held by 
liberals, but also that they would show that liberals were unwilling to allow for democratic 
dissent. One SDS member wrote that the confrontation at the Convention showed that what 
“school children learn, and politicians believe, that the American political system approaches 
perfection…The militant delegations at the Convention broke both these precepts.”ccxcv Hayden 
and others argued that it was through confrontation that the system and more importantly its 
current actors could be revealed as undemocratic—and SDS as a democratic alternative.  
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 Spiegel would go on in his speech to insist that now was a better time than ever to 
confront the system and its actors. He said, “Here at home, militant blacks and Draft resisters and 
organizers will bear the brunt of repression…Both of these struggles have the seeds, necessary 
but sufficient, of a direct confrontation with State power—the non-co-optable issue.”ccxcvi In 
Spiegel’s view, the current political climate, because of the Black Power movement and the 
direct threat of the Draft to so many white citizens, could inspire in protestors the willingness to 
confront a more powerful system. The goal of this confrontation, according to Spiegel, was to 
expose the brutal nature of the government—and in doing so, inspire in the people a 
revolutionary consciousness. He said of confrontational struggles that “they carry the greatest 
possibilities now of increasing consciousness—of understanding the nature of the real 
enemy…[the struggles must] build a consciousness that the State is the mechanism of repressive 
force, that it is through the state that the ruling class exercises its power.”ccxcvii  Being violently 
repressed was, in Spiegel’s view, a positive contribution to the movement because it exposed the 
true, undemocratic nature of the political actors in power. 
 Like Siegel, a number of SDS radicals made the argument that it was only once the 
government had been exposed through confrontation that the people, finally recognizing the real 
nature of that government, would be inspired to fight the revolution. Rich Rothstein wrote that 
revolution was clearly the right option for most Americans—they just had to understand the 
situation correctly. Rothstein wrote, “A popular American revolution is in the interest of the vast 
majority of Americans who are exploited economically, emotionally, and socially by the present 
structure of American capitalism.”ccxcviii  Since the system tried to cover up that exploitation, it 
was necessary to force that reality out. He wrote that “it is possible to expose to this majority the 
mechanisms by which they are manipulated and exploited in their day-to-day lives; but until 
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these mechanisms are exposed, a popular American revolution is impossible.”ccxcix Fighting for 
such exposure would require commitment and sacrifice; Rothstein insisted that “only those 
organizers who sincerely empathize with the plight of the American majority can be in a position 
to expose this exploitation.”ccc But in Rothstein’s mind that exposure was essential, as only 
through the exposure of government’s and the democratic (and capitalist) system’s moral 
corruption could SDS members convince the public that it was in their interests to take risks in 
the name of revolution. 
 There was similar talk regarding the confrontation at Columbia University. J. Wesley 
Harding wrote in to NLN about the growing political consciousness that he felt was a direct result 
of the confrontation at the University. Harding wrote, “What is really exciting is the growth in 
political understanding—a growth which parallels exactly the increasing militancy of the 
students. Growing numbers of students have had their minds exploded with anti-racist, anti-
imperialist, and anti-capitalist consciousness.”ccci And like Rothstein, Harding argued that that 
consciousness was a revolutionary one: “The word revolution is not thrown around as it has been 
in the past. There are no illusions about a free university in an unfree society.”cccii Confrontation 
had drawn lines between the two groups and shown the coercive and undemocratic aspects of 
those in power: like Rothstein, Harding felt this exposure was necessary for and led to a 
revolutionary consciousness—though these supposed revolutionaries, as it was shown earlier, 
were expected to hold on to their democratic goals and ideals. 
 
Confrontation As A Politically Viable Strategy,  
 For the reasons above, but also many others, many SDS members argued for the benefits 
of confrontation. There were those who argued that it was the best way to attract public support 
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for the SDS cause. Tom Hayden made this argument in the same pre-Convention interview with 
NLN cited earlier. One of the ways he foresaw confrontation being useful to the organization’s 
recruiting efforts was in terms of increasing SDS’s public visibility. He said of the confrontation 
in Chicago: “First, it is a way of surfacing, in a very militant way, the anti-war movement after a 
period in which it has been knocked out.”ccciii He did not view confrontation as the only useful 
tool for attracting public support, but he claimed that it served an important role in any social 
movement. Hayden commented, “In principle, anybody who’s been involved in local organizing, 
as I was…knows that an occasional confrontation and mobilization can be a great advantage…It 
can make you visible to people you want to organize.”ccciv Seeing people committed to a cause 
and fighting for it might make other individuals think about that cause for the first time, and 
potentially join the fight. Hayden also believed that direct confrontation was useful because it 
provided a direct injection of energy into the base. He proposed that “local organizing can 
become stagnant like a pool of water unless it’s stirred occasionally with mobilization 
tactics.”cccv 
There was a sense that action was better than theorizing; that the chaos that was 
associated with confrontation would play into the protestors’ hands; and that it could energize an 
otherwise lackluster base of support. John M. Lamb wrote in to NLN, “A confrontation at the 
Democratic Convention will not play into [President Lyndon] Johnson hands, because riots, 
disruption, and mobilization of the National Guard all tend to undermine confidence in and 
support for the people in power.”cccvi The public would see that the government could not 
control—was oppressing—its people, and that those people were upset enough to put their lives 
at risk, and it would side with the protestors.  
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 Some pushed for confrontation because they felt that it was the best way to express that 
the movement was committed to its cause and willing to act and sacrifice on behalf of it; it was a 
way to respond to criticisms that SDS members were only serious in rhetoric. A piece in NLN 
titled “Respect for Lawlessness,” and credited to ‘Up Against the Wall Motherfuckers,’ 
epitomized this attitude. It read, “IT IS NO LONGER ENOUGH TO RAISE 
CONSCIOUSNESS. THAT CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE EXPRESSED.”cccvii There was a 
push within SDS to act more radically—more militantly. Authors in one NLN article complained, 
“Despite the rhetoric of resistance, there has, up to now, been no qualitative shift in our 
activity…For all the militant rhetoric and revolutionary slogans, the substance of the campaigns 
is politically minimal.”cccviii  The solution lay in direct, militant confrontation. The authors wrote: 
“At this point we must recognize that SDS should be aiming at…radical politics.”cccix From 
confrontation and conflict came action: A NLN article read, “Key to all this is the need for 
militancy, the need for struggle…we learn from every organizing situation that people change 
from being challenged, and that it is in situations of sharp conflict that people are forced to 
act.”cccx 
An Argument for Confrontation, then Negotiation  
 I have suggested that moral absolutists and compromisers can and should play 
complementary roles within a social movement. Moral absolutists can use their conviction and 
commitment to the cause to confront those who are more powerful and show that the group is 
serious in its critique. By doing so, they can raise the group’s bargaining power—at which point 
the moral compromisers in the group can step in and make deals. Of course, the absolutists in the 
group might oppose the second stage of negotiation, but if they are truly committed to the cause 
and they recognize that not everyone in the movement will share their absolutist view, they may 
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sacrifice their insistence on absolutism during a negotiation process because they recognize that 
such steps are necessary for building up a necessary base of public support behind their cause. 
After all, most oppositional social movements have absolutists at their core, but not throughout 
the ranks—a fact accepted by that core. 
 A series of events at Northwestern University (NU) in the spring of 1968 illustrate how a 
strategy of confrontation and negotiation can potentially lead a social movement toward the 
completion of its goals. The conflict started when the Afro-American Student Union (AASU) of 
Northwestern drew up a list of fourteen demands and presented it to the University 
administration. The students took a firm tone to begin with; Jim Turner spoke for the group at a 
press conference, saying: ‘“We want a definite response on each demand by dinnertime tonight. 
We simply demand an affirmative or a negative statement on each one of the fourteen points. If 
the Administration does not satisfactorily accept the demands there will be a confrontation 
tomorrow.’”cccxi They threatened confrontation and insisted that their requests be considered 
immediately, but their language was not fully absolutist—there was an indication that while they 
were serious, they might be willing to negotiate: they did not insist that the administration meet 
all their demands, but rather that it meet them ‘satisfactorily’—a noteworthy word because of its 
vagueness. 
 But the oppositional group would show the next day that it meant business. When there 
was no immediate answer from the Administration, AASU followed through with its threat. NLN 
recapped: “NU black students seized control of the University Financial Affairs building at 619 
Clark Avenue in a quickly-executed action at 7:40 a.m. Friday, after the Administration had 
failed to respond to the AASU demands.”cccxii As the day went on the protestors attracted more 
student support, but it was still unclear if the Administration was taking them seriously. And so 
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instead of being despondent, the group escalated its confrontation: they meant business. NLN 
wrote, “At 11:45 a.m., twenty white students took control of the Dean of Students’ office on the 
second floor of Scott Hall.”cccxiii  Inspired by the black students’ confrontational tactics, white 
students joined the fight, and this time—threatened by a coalition and also by the group’s 
growing militancy—the Administration started to listen. It didn’t take long: “Negotiations 
between AASU leadership and Dean of Students Roland Hinz began at noon.”cccxiv Only once 
confrontations had threatened the power of those higher up in the hierarchy could negotiations 
begin. 
 Not that success via negotiation came immediately: it was a process during which the 
oppositional group continually had to assert its seriousness and its ability and willingness to 
threaten those in power. Negotiations between the group and administrators lasted from noon to 
five P.M., when they were “broken off,” only to start up again at 6:30 P.M.cccxv After a full day 
of discussion with the Administration, it was the oppositional group that dictated the pace of 
negotiation: “At 10:30 p.m. [University President] Hinz returned to the steps of the Finance 
Building and was told that the black student leadership were exhausted and that they would be 
prepared to negotiate again at 8 a.m. Saturday.”cccxvi   
 After another full day dedicated to negotiation, the protestors won—and they won big. 
NLN wrote, “All of the black demands were met except for the demand for control over the 
hiring of black faculty members. This point was resolved by the Administration’s ‘strong 
suggestion’ to the faculty that black professorships be offered…There will be no disciplinary 
action taken against any white or black students.”cccxvii  Issues of great moral and practical import 
to AASU that were initially ignored or dismissed by the Administration were ultimately resolved 
largely in the oppositional group’s favor, first through confrontation—and then through 
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negotiation. The group was not necessarily split into moral absolutists and moral compromisers, 
but its members seemed to take on the different attitudes when it seemed most to their advantage 
to be absolute or compromising. They were, therefore, unwilling to budge on their demand that 
the Administration pay them heed and backed up their claims by confronting and threatening the 
legitimacy of those in power; and they were willing to compromise on at least one of their 
demands, recognizing that even if they had not been able to achieve everything they had wanted, 
their agreement with the Administration signaled progress for their cause. 
 Eric Mann was optimistic when he suggested in a NLN article that preceded the NU 
events that “confrontation and negotiation will be the dominant political style in the immediate 
future.”cccxviii  But there were not many events that so clearly and effectively illustrated the 
benefits of confrontation and negotiation, and absolutists and compromisers often appeared 
unwilling to acknowledge the potential benefits that the other side could provide. In the piece, 
Mann pleads with radicals to consider the potential benefits of negotiation, but while he 
recognizes the benefits of confrontation, he does not ask individuals more inclined toward 
compromise to recognize the benefits of radicals. Mann addresses the radicals when he says, “In 
some situations, by taking the programmatic initiative and developing alliances with liberal 
student-government types and liberal faculty members, we can win our demands.”cccxix He 
criticizes the absolutist assumption “that the response of corporate-liberal university 
administrators [to SDS demands] will be blanket opposition.”cccxx Surely Mann is right when he 
insists that SDS strategy should not solely be confrontation—but also negotiation. But just as 
compromisers are vital to making the latter strategy effective, absolutists are important for the 
first step when they oppose an entrenched group that ignores the opposition’s voice and 
demands.  
 82 
  
Why Confrontation Didn’t Work 
 In this chapter I have discussed some of the arguments made within SDS for and against 
confrontational politics. I have identified potential benefits of a confrontational and conflict-
appreciative view of democratic politics, and I have noted some of the claims made in defense of 
famed SDS confrontations at Columbia and the Democratic National Convention, to name only 
two. And yet while I wouldn’t go as far as David Barber in calling SDS a failure, I think it is 
difficult to contest that SDS did not achieve the type of fundamental change that it had set out, at 
least in rhetoric and sometimes in practice, to make. Nor does it seem right to think of a group 
that splintered into fighting factions and then disappeared altogether in 1969 a complete success. 
SDS did not, for most of its existence, solely practice confrontational politics, and surely the 
organization’s failures are not attributable to the one tactic. But as the public’s response to the 
Democratic National Convention melee shows, confrontations did not always bring about the 
positive results that SDS hoped it would. Since I connected an absolutist commitment to a cause 
to a willingness to sacrifice oneself to potential harm in a confrontation against a more powerful 
political foe, and since this thesis is about the contribution of moral absolutists to democracy and 
oppositional social movements, it makes sense to look at why these confrontations didn’t always 
succeed—and what that means for arguments in defense of confrontational politics and moral 
absolutists. 
 On its surface and with the mentioned arguments in favor of confrontational politics in 
mind, the confrontation at the Democratic National Convention in 1968 might on the surface 
appear as if it would be an illustrative example of the political success that can result from that 
strategy. After all, lines were clearly drawn, and descriptions of the clash in chapter two suggest 
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that what SDS members viewed as the repressive, violent, and arguably undemocratically 
impatient and intolerant nature of the dirty-hands politicians and their coercive forces were 
exposed. Police brutality against protestors, particularly in front of the Conrad Hilton Hotel, was 
broadcast throughout the country and world. And the demonstrators that did show up were 
courageous and, if the public was so inclined, potentially inspiring. Gitlin wrote of them, “Those 
who braved Chicago were determined, at the least, not to be intimidated.”cccxxi Perhaps they 
would, by showing their own commitment to it, motivate others to join and fight for their cause.  
By all indications, then, it seems that the confrontation would be a politically successful 
one for SDS. Gitlin, who found himself in Chicago among the chaos, describes wavering 
between feeling optimistic and disillusioned. He writes, “Was it streetfighting or revolution?  
Was the feeling desperation or exultation?”cccxxii  He was at times optimistic: It seemed that police 
brutality was driving home the SDS critique that members had pushed for so long. He writes, 
“The astounding fact is…that we were winning.”cccxxiii  Gitlin wondered, “Had we stumbled into a 
people’s war against the cops, in which every repressive move by the authorities would ricochet 
back at them?”cccxxiv Was SDS finally driving home its point—had they finally exposed the 
establishment to be the morally corrupted institution they insisted it was? 
Gitlin writes that Tom Hayden encouraged those gathered in Chicago to think of the 
confrontation as the start of a revolution. According to Gitlin, Hayden spoke in a serious, 
moralist tone of revolution—and seemed clear in his willingness to make sacrifices in order to 
make it happen. He recalls, “I heard Tom Hayden speak, in chillingly cavalier tones, about street 
actions which would run the risk of getting people killed,”cccxxv though he notes that there were 
others who “thought the risks were too great and the ethics wrong, and spoke up for nonviolent 
witness.”cccxxvi  But Hayden’s conviction and energy stuck. Gitlin says, “Those were the days in 
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which Hayden appeared, moraliste extraordinaire, in the dreams of more than one Old New 
Leftist.”cccxxvii  And there was a sense that this was the start of something real—that finally there 
was action behind the revolutionary SDS rhetoric. Says Gitlin, “We were awash in the purity of 
the we-versus-them feeling on the streets, the crazy battlefield sense that all of life was 
concentrated right here, forever.”cccxxviii  Was this the kind of spark that confrontation could 
provide to a movement?  
Gitlin and other SDS members present at the confrontation were at the very least 
convinced that the police brutality caught on video and witnessed by journalists would give 
credence to the SDS argument that the system was morally corrupted and its politicians were 
acting undemocratically. They assumed that the public would, now that the lines were even more 
clearly drawn and the violence of the other side exposed, jump to SDS’s defense. How could the 
public not side with SDS, after seeing what Gitlin saw at the Hilton? 
At the corner of the Hilton, a little later, two phalanxes of cops blocked what was 
left of Dave Dellinger’s would-be [nonviolent] march, and after a series of 
scuffles they scythed into the crowd in apparent unison, smashing heads and 
limbs and crotches, yelling ‘Kill, kill, kill,’ spraying bystanders and 
demonstrators with Mace, squeezing the trapped, terrified crowd until one 
demonstrator wearing boots had the presence of mind to kick through the 
window of the Haymarket Lounge, shattering it, and some people scampered and 
others were shoved through, many slashed by glass, only to be pursued inside 
and then clubbed and knocked around again by police screaming ‘Get out of 
here, you cocksuckers’…One Mobe [National Mobilization Committee] 
organizer who tried to restore order was battered between his legs and on his 
head (twenty-two stitches) as he tried to negotiate a truce with the deputy 
superintendent of police.cccxxix 
 
To Gitlin, it was inconceivable that the public might side with the police. The lines were 
clearly drawn, and SDS was in the right: it was that simple. And so he and the rest of SDS were 
shocked when the public did, in fact, choose the other side. Gitlin writes of the distressing news, 
“To our innocent eyes, it defied common sense that people could watch even the sliver of the 
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onslaught that got onto television and side with the cops—which in fact was precisely what the 
polls showed.”cccxxx It appeared that at some point the SDS movement had become unattractive 
to the general public—perhaps even more unattractive than the Vietnam War. Gitlin comments, 
“As unpopular as the war had become, the antiwar movement was detested still more—the most 
hated political group in America, disliked even by most of the people who supported immediate 
withdrawal from Vietnam.”cccxxxi  The confrontation in Chicago had made clear to the public the 
different sides; showed the other side to be violent; and displayed to the public many SDS 
members’ commitment to the organization’s cause and fight. But it failed to do the thing that all 
these developments were meant to lead toward: it didn’t win over the greater public to SDS as 
the alternative to the current system (the confrontation did, however, lead to a jump in student 
involvement and membership in the organization).cccxxxii  
According to Gitlin, it was this failure with the general public that led members to further 
isolate themselves and the movement from the greater society it had once aimed to win over; 
harden their views; zero in on an unrealistic revolution; and ultimately, because of fights 
amongst themselves, to destroy the organization. David Barber comments of Gitlin and other 
scholars who he assigns to the “traditional liberal school”cccxxxiii  of thought on SDS: 
“Represented by scholars and former activists like Todd Gitlin, Maurice Isserman, and Tom 
Hayden, this liberal school argues that the New Left uncritically followed in the wake of the 
Black Power movement, substituted rage for reason, and collapsed when this rage alienated 
mainstream Americans.”cccxxxiv  When SDS lost the support of the American mainstream, then, it 
is argued by this ‘liberal school’ that SDS mistakenly made an absolutist and militant turn that 
spelled the end of the organization and its valuable critique. 
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Gitlin does indeed appear to make this argument. He says in his book that SDS didn’t 
know how to respond to the lack of public support following the Democratic National 
Convention confrontation, and that it was after the confrontation that the group made the fatal 
mistake of becoming more militant and absolutist—instead of pausing to consider why the public 
had rejected its critique, and adjusting its strategies to make its arguments more palatable. Gitlin 
reflects, “I was hardly alone in taking Chicago as a revelation that there was ‘no turning back’.  
Much of the movement felt that way.”cccxxxv  He writes that much of SDS didn’t come to terms 
with the public’s response, or viewed their growing isolation as a positive sign: “Having 
unmasked the Democrats as Democrats, the late New Left convinced itself that the movement’s 
unpopularity was either skin-deep or a proof of our revolutionary mettle, or both.”cccxxxvi  He 
comments, “Now, the movement’s will and moral seriousness, unhinged from real possibilities, 
hardened into our own cage.”cccxxxvii  The moral absolutism that he blames for ending the 
organization, then, he connects to a sense of desperation and disconnect from political reality.  
In Gitlin’s mind, SDS opposition to the government was never rooted in a desire among 
members to take power themselves. The push came from the critique. He writes, “Clarity might 
have answered: The movement, whatever it says, has no serious intention of ruling; we are once 
and for all a youth movement, aiming to reform our elders.”cccxxxviii  The goal was to expose the 
dirty-hands politicians, but that was the end of it: revolution had never been on the table. He 
writes, “We had committed ourselves to ‘demystifying’ institutions, but once the mask of 
legitimacy was stripped away to reveal brute force—at Columbia, in Chicago—then 
what?”cccxxxix  Gitlin claims then, that the movement aimed to critique the dirty-hands politicians 
in power—to reform them—but not to overthrow them; talk of revolution came from 
desperation, and a failure to come to terms with the political reality.  
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Gitlin suggests that the absolutism and militancy that followed the Chicago confrontation 
was a tool that SDS members used to protect themselves against having to face the political 
reality: it was the easy way out. He writes, “I wasn’t the only radical who felt more comfortable 
in the clarity of an all-or-nothing scenario.”cccxl Talking of revolution allowed members to dream, 
even if it did ultimately lead to the collapse of the organization. Gitlin writes, “To invoke The 
Revolution was to claim title to the future; to see beyond raids and trials and wiretaps and empire 
and war and guilt; to justify the tedium of mimeographing one more leaflet, working out one 
more position, suffering through one more insufferable meeting.”cccxli  It was a way to keep 
energy and commitment superficially high when members knew that their efforts were doomed. 
“To speak of The Revolution was automatically to acquire a pedigree, heroes, martyrs, allies, 
texts, and therefore anchorage.”cccxlii  It anchored the movement, but it required a commitment to 
a false reality and a disingenuous vision. 
Gitlin also connects the movement’s turn toward absolutism and militancy to an 
irrationality and loss of dialogue, both of which he identifies as reasons for the movement’s later 
collapse in 1969. He writes, “To speak of The Revolution was to postpone vexing questions 
about socialism, anarchism, democracy.  The Revolution was a solvent for strategic doubts, 
moral qualms, and internecine skirmishes…it was the collective willingness to suspend one’s 
better judgment.”cccxliii  He claims, “To invoke The Revolution was, in short, to acquire 
prepackaged identity.”cccxliv It was a way to act without having to think first—and, in Gitlin’s 
mind, it continued to isolate the movement from the general public. He wrote that the militant 
members of SDS appeared condescending and self-righteous, “hinting that they were in 
possession of the philosopher’s stone.”cccxlv It was this misguided turn in the movement that, 
Gitlin argues, led to SDS’s ultimate destruction.  
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So the no-longer-new Left trapped itself in a seamless loop: growing militancy, 
growing isolation, growing commitment to The Revolution, sloppier and more 
frantic attempts to imagine a revolutionary class, growing hatred among the 
competing factions with their competing imaginations, growing vulnerability to 
repression.  Students for a Democratic Society, the movement’s main 
organizational web, became its final battlefield.  As the organization was pulled 
apart by cannibal factions, most of the remnants of the old New Left stood aside, 
demoralized, gazing in fascinated horror as sideshow theatrics became the 
movement’s main act.cccxlvi  
 
 And so it is that Gitlin ends his book largely by placing the blame for the movement’s 
failures on the moral absolutism and radicalism that he argues led to SDS’s downfall. It was 
because of the absolutists and the radicals that the movement didn’t push through the kind of 
lasting change it wanted—it was because of them that “the New Left failed to produce the 
political leaders one might have expected of a movement so vast.”cccxlvii  Gitlin writes that moral 
absolutism and an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality did not translate into practical politics:  
The millennial, all-or-nothing moods of the Sixties proved to be poor training for 
practical politics. The premium the movement placed on the glories and agonies 
of the pure existential will ill equipped many of us to slog away in coalitions in a 
society crisscrossed by divisions, a society not cleanly polarized along a single 
moral axis, a society not poised on the edge of radical change.cccxlviii  
 
 Change would have required patience more suited to actors with less moral urgency and 
who were more willing to compromise; it called for gradualists, not absolutists. Gitlin argues that 
the absolutist turn that largely followed the public’s decision to side with the police in Chicago 
was not appropriate for a society that was not polarized, or ready for the radical change that these 
SDS members fought for—without compromise.  
 
Arguments Against Moral Absolutism, From Within the SDS Movement 
 Gitlin retrospectively argues against moral absolutism and confrontational politics he 
associates with an all-or-nothing attitude, but there were SDS members who made similar 
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arguments at that time. There was the argument that SDS was isolating itself from potential, 
necessary coalitions—both outside of and within the organization. Karl North wrote in to NLN 
that a recent article “is absolutist and as such is typical of the kind of arguments hippies and 
politicos should stop throwing at each other. There are substantive issues between the two 
groups, but we’ll never get down to them until we clear away from the hash.”cccxlix North urged 
members to see that “some elements of both are requisite.”cccl Absolutism prevented discussion, 
and this could be dangerous to a social movement that needed to establish common ground if it 
wanted to build the public support necessary to make its critique realized. 
 Eric Mann emphasized the dangers of absolutist isolation in a NLN article in March 1968. 
He wrote that while there were benefits to idealistic purity, absolutists, “By trying to avoid co-
optation they often isolate themselves from struggles which the ‘masses’ think are important, 
such as large peace demonstrations, elections, and poverty programs.”cccli Related to the concern 
that confrontational politics might scare off potential public supporters was a fear that SDS 
absolutists gave an impression, by being morally condescending, that they weren’t even 
interested in garnering that support. Hayden warned that young McCarthy supporters 
“feel…severe criticism which often seems to come from the Left, from SDS people on 
campus…so they can quite easily be turned off by the Left.”ccclii He asked that SDS members try 
to “respect the genuine experiences of the McCarthy students.”cccliii  It was important not to be 
morally condescending. 
 And there was evidence that some individuals were turned off by SDS’s moral 
absolutism. One former member wrote to NLN that the reason he “is disillusioned with SDS is 
that SDS…is rapidly becoming a new fundamentalist religion…The world is divided into the 
saved and the damned. Anyone who does not meekly accept the ‘correct line’ is automatically an 
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‘agent’ of Satan (the ruling class capitalist pig).”cccliv Doggett denounced what he saw as “this 
new fundamentalist Puritanism.”ccclv Confrontational politics and delineating sides might be 
valuable contributions to democracy, but what if the lines are drawn in too tight—are too 
limiting and isolating? 
 
Another Way to Look at the Failures of SDS  
 There are certainly negative aspects of moral absolutism, and not all moral absolutists 
would make the positive contributions to democracy that I have outlined—just as SDS showed 
that moral compromise might not be as positive a political approach as Walzer or even Dovi 
might imagine. Thankfully, I am not arguing that moral absolutists can only have a positive 
influence on a social movement and on democracy, or that all activists or citizens should strive to 
be absolutist; but I do disagree with the view that their influence is solely a negative one—or 
even that they are always less important to a country’s democratic well-being that those who are 
willing to compromise.  
I argue that Gitlin’s historical analysis, like the political theory of Walzer, Hollis and 
others, discredits moral absolutists and political radicals too fully. It does not recognize enough 
their contributions to the New Left movement and it unfairly focuses on their influence on the 
movement at a specific place in time from which scholars and researchers are more likely to 
draw negative impressions. It does not acknowledge how moral absolutists were active and often 
contributed positively to SDS before the Chicago confrontation—and not only leading up to the 
organization’s collapse—and it does not value the integral role of moral absolutists in an 
oppositional social movement’s operations and structure. It places the blame too squarely on the 
shoulders of moral absolutists and political radicals. At times in the movement’s history, I lean 
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toward Barber’s claim that SDS members were not absolutist or radical enough; at other times, I 
feel that confrontation should have been followed by negotiation led by moral compromisers 
within the movement. But to discredit one or the other side completely misses the important 
contributions that each made to the social movement. 
 Similarly, it is too simple to dismiss the value of confrontational politics because, in the 
case of SDS, those politics did not lead to the kinds of changes that the organization wanted. The 
public chose the other side, but that does not mean that this would always be the result of a 
confrontational-style politics practiced by an oppositional social movement against the 
government. There are plenty of examples—recall the civil rights movement—of the public 
siding against the government and in favor of the opposition.  
And even if the public did not side with SDS, was there really no value to the 
organization’s decision to say and make clear through its actions, loudly and aggressively, that 
its members and much of the youth of America were unsatisfied with the current political system 
and its political actors? That they disagreed—unreasonably? That they wanted to hold politicians 
morally accountable for their actions? That they were willing to resist and possibly die for what 
they believed? If anything, Gitlin’s recognition that society was not morally polarized or ready 
for the radical change that SDS wanted makes SDS’s critique all the more valuable, even if it 
failed to get the requisite public support that would have made the movement a greater and more 
lasting success. For that difference with—opposition to—greater society and its willingness to 
compromise was what inspired the movement in the first place.  
If the confrontations in Chicago and around the country, which, I have argued, were 
largely inspired and led by SDS absolutists and radicals, had convinced the public to side with 
SDS, I believe that it would still most likely be compromisers receiving the credit for the 
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movement’s success—just as they were absolved of responsibility for its failures. Even then, we 
would skim over the contributions of the absolutists because absolutists are, at face value, 
undemocratic and scary. Their commitment to their cause can lead to violence or political 
extremism; they are not always ruled by a steady sense of calm or rational judgment. We value 
stability, but they often aim to topple our very foundations. They demand things from us that we 
aren’t willing to give up, and we may feel threatened by them. They can’t be swayed by a strong 
argument from the other side. We don’t want to recognize the value of moral absolutists because 
absolutists are unreasonable, irrational—and, I argue, vital to a democratic polity that should 
wrestle with tough moral questions and have an active citizenship that directly challenges 
individuals and the system to be better.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 In this chapter, I have argued for the benefits of confrontation and conflict in 
democracy—and I have tried to show that moral absolutists are essential to these important 
efforts. I believe that moral absolutists must often lead confrontational politics because an 
absolutist dedication to a cause is often necessary for individuals to make the sacrifices that 
come with directly opposing and challenging a more powerful force. This confrontation is 
necessary to delineate political stances and to have the public decide on one, often a step forward 
in expanding democracy to formerly oppressed groups and a recognition that there is and should 
be real, fundamental and absolute moral disagreements among citizens; to expose the system’s 
undemocratic practices and hold accountable its leaders; and it is needed to build a social 
movement public support. In the chapter, I have challenged Gitlin and others who blame the 
failures of SDS on a militant and absolutist turn, instead pointing to historical factors that may 
have been responsible. 
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Chapter Four: A Review of Agonal Political Theory, Joel Olson 
and Abolitionist John Brown 
 I have argued thus far that the case of SDS shows that dirty-hands theory errs when it 
completely lauds moral compromisers and discounts moral absolutists, and that Dovi, by limiting 
absolutists’ potentially positive power, does not extend her support for them far enough. In the 
previous chapter, I have tried to illustrate through SDS that confrontation and conflict are 
essential aspects of democracy and that the theorists I cite in chapter one overvalue consensus 
and compromise. 
            In this chapter I acknowledge that I am not alone in arguing for a more conflict-heavy 
view of democracy: agonal political theorists like Bonnie Honig also emphasize the importance 
of political disagreement. But as I show through Joel Olson’s critique, agonal theorists also fail 
to sufficiently recognize the potential benefits of moral absolutists. They draw the line at those 
conflicts between individuals who do not respect each other or who refuse to compromise—
therefore, they do not appreciate conflicts between moral absolutists and some other, 
uncompromising party. 
While Olson appreciates moral absolutism and political extremism as political strategies, 
he does not value enough the actual absolutist actors. Part of the reason I wrote this thesis was 
because I was inspired by the bravery and courage of moral absolutists whose willingness to 
sacrifice their lives and privileges for a cause often seemed to be against their immediate, 
rational self-interest. And yet Olson speaks of moral absolutism as a political strategy that an 
individual might adopt or reject depending on whether he thinks it best serves his immediate 
political interests—he presents it as an unemotional, rational choice. He uses abolitionist 
Wendell Phillips as his case study but I argue that defending Phillips, who grounded his 
arguments in rational explanations, never advocated violence and was a staunch pacifist, is too 
easy a choice.  
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I quickly review the history of radical abolitionist John Brown to show that Olson’s 
choice was perhaps too safe—and misses why absolutists, through their often inexplicable 
passion and daring, both terrify and excite us. I choose Brown because he reveals the sometimes 
difficult, irrational, and emotional nature of moral absolutists that make them at certain times 
hard and at other times easy to defend. I bring Brown into the discussion because I argue that 
moral absolutists are often extraordinary individuals, and Brown’s case is a well-researched one. 
I challenge Olson’s view that being a moral absolutist is simply a means to an end—and not 
something more personal and exceptional. 
        
Bonnie Honig, Agonal Theory, and an Argument for Conflict between Tolerant, Respectful 
Individuals 
 In Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics, Bonnie Honig argues for an agonal 
political theory that is more accepting of conflict and political dissidence and recognizes their 
value to democracy. Honig contests the emphasis of many political theorists on consensus, and 
only consensus, which in her view leads them to ignore or silence political outsiders whose 
challenges and political disruptions are essential to crucial democratic efforts to keep “the 
contest of identity and difference going.”ccclvi She fears that these theorists run the risk of closing 
the open forum for political disagreement and identity redefinition that marks and makes 
democracy great. She writes that her work is largely motivated by her “concern for the 
preservation of political space in late modern times.”ccclvii  Honig denounces what she sees as an 
assumption that flows from—and produces—this dangerous move toward closure: that whatever 
promotes social harmony is ‘right’ and ‘fits’ and that anything that threatens to disrupt it should 
be shut down or eliminated. She fears that this assumption could lead to a repressive state that 
seeks to exclude those individuals who do not ‘fit’, and a populace that, on an individual level, 
tries to conform all aspects of the self that do not match those of society’s prescribed citizen.  
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 Honig argues that political theory that fails to acknowledge the benefits of political 
disruption is undemocratic. She labels it ‘virtue’ theory and she writes, “The virtue theorists’ 
assumption that it is possible and desirable to contain or expel the disruptions of politics has 
antidemocratic resonances, if by democracy one means a set of arrangements that perpetually 
generates popular (both local and global) political action as well as generating the practices that 
legitimate representative institutions.”ccclviii  Only emphasizing consensus means silencing 
‘others’ and removing their voice from politics. Honig writes, “To render problematic the 
assumption of fittedness is not to say that these virtue theories of politics do not fit some of their 
subjects quite well; it is, instead, to focus on the depoliticizing effects of their assumption of 
fittedness.”ccclix The outsider who does not ‘fit’ is not viewed as a political subject, and his 
potential political contributions are thus ignored or repressed.  
In ‘virtue’ politics, the outsider is undemocratically excluded from politics. Honig writes 
of Michael Sandel and John Rawls, both of whom she assigns to the ‘virtue’ camp: “Each 
depoliticizes remainders and treats the other as an outside agitator who comes from somewhere 
else to disrupt an otherwise peaceful and stable set of arrangements.” Honig not only argues that 
these outsiders should be valued politically, but also that they are not because they threaten the 
assumptions these theorists make. She writes, “Contra Rawls and Sandel, I argue that these 
remainders are potential sites of politics, and each has the power to disrupt and politicize 
established assumptions about agency, rationality, or the good, and that this is why each of these 
theorists is so anxious to exteriorize the remainders of his position rather than engage them.”ccclx 
Unlike ‘virtue’ theorists, Honig believes that “in matters of identity, it is not possible to get it 
right—”ccclxi like Hannah Arendt, she suggests that “the mark of true politics…[is] a perpetual 
openness to the possibility of re-founding.”ccclxii It is political outsiders who disrupt consensus 
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politics and who Honig believes push that re-founding by questioning current assumptions. It is 
because these outsiders challenge many of the assumptions on which ‘virtue’ theorists base their 
arguments and visions that Honig believes those same theorists aim to discount and exclude 
outsiders from democratic politics. 
Honig similarly takes on Immanuel Kant for this effort to define perfectly and once and 
for all the good political subject—and to eliminate any alternative conception. She writes of 
Kant, “He sees no promise in the self’s resistance to the ordering of subjectivity, no dimension of 
struggle that is worthy of affirmation.”ccclxiii  Honig, however, argues that “resistance to the 
requirements of moral virtue and subjectivity is cause not for mourning but for celebration.”ccclxiv 
It is because of this resistance, Honig argues, that politics remain alive and active and institutions 
are held accountable. She comments, “Without these spaces of resistance and resistibility, there 
would be no action, no self-display, no self-enactment, no virtù; there would be only legal, 
judicial, bureaucratic administration or despotism, behavior, self-concealment, and virtue.”ccclxv 
Without resistance, there wouldn’t be any passion or progress in politics; the more likely result 
would be government corruption and repression. 
 Honig encourages conflict because she believes it fosters political openness. She worries 
that theorists like Kant, by demanding people act in a specific way, limit individuals’ political 
and personal freedom. In this regard, Honig sides with Friedrich Nietzsche and Arendt: “Like 
Nietzsche, Arendt worries that the ordering of the self into a moral, well-behaved subject 
diminishes its propensity to act creatively and spontaneously.”ccclxvi  Honig values Nietzsche’s 
unwillingness to submit to any one political theorist’s idea of what is morally right and what 
wrong. Along with Nietzsche and Arendt, Honig “admires the agon and seeks to protect it from 
closure, from domination by any one idea, truth, essence, individual, or institution.”ccclxvii  She 
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worries about certain ‘virtue’ theorists’ insistence that people adhere to the theorists’ conceptions 
and not contest them. Honig writes of this undemocratic, almost authoritarian presence in Rawls’ 
work, which she ties to an intolerance for difference: “Throughout A Theory of Justice, the 
citizens’ responses to the other in themselves and in other persons testify not to a sensitivity to or 
respect for others but to an impatience, anger, hostility, and incomprehension that silences or 
coerces those whose dissonance destabilizes the Rawlsian order.”ccclxviii  Theorists have an 
incentive to keep their assumptions unquestioned, but Honig argues that to work according to 
that incentive is to limit democratic possibilities and practices.  
Contestation, Honig argues, forces the government to stay honest and democratic. She 
fears that the assumption of ‘fittedness’ and the closure that she argues accompanies such an 
assumption allows the state too much unchallenged authority. She writes that agonal or ‘virtù’ 
theories of politics, on the other hand, “reject, problematize, or resist any attempt to ground 
political authority unproblematically in a law of laws that is immune to contestation or 
amendment.”ccclxix Honig believes that conceptions and laws should always be open to revision 
because we haven’t—and never will—get them perfectly right. Agonal politics are superior to 
‘virtue’ politics because they encourage contestation and political disagreement. Honig writes 
“that increases in justice will come with the proliferation, not the diminution, of political sites, 
with a politicizing rather than conciliatory response to the state’s monopoly on the administration 
of justice.”ccclxx Fully accepting the state as the only arbiter of justice gives it too much power 
and leads it toward corruption. 
Opposition to the government then, is at times essential to maintaining a just 
democracy—and a crucial duty of being a citizen. Honig writes, “Democratic citizens must 
resist, not reconcile themselves to, the state’s consolidations of its status as the locus of power as 
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well as its corresponding reduction of politics to administration and of citizenship to passive 
consumerism.”ccclxxi  And she recognizes that this opposition, though essential, will not always be 
easy: “The closures represented by law, responsibility, authority, the state, community, and 
sex/gender (to mention only a few) are not immobile…their sedimentations also have 
disempowering effects that are not easily overcome or challenged.”ccclxxii  The state and its 
institutions must at times be challenged and opposed, even when this task is difficult because the 
individuals standing in opposition are disempowered or depoliticized by the current system—
whose undemocratic roots may run deep in society’s fabric.  
 Honig’s ‘virtù’ politics requires a dedication to contestation and resistance. She writes, 
“virtù theories of politics value—they do not try to soothe or efface—the undecidable other’s 
disruptions of language, law, morality, and subjectivity because the other keeps the 
contest…going.”ccclxxiii  To make this happen, especially against difficult odds and powerful state 
actors and societal norms, requires commitment. Honig adds, “To keep the contest going requires 
a commitment to a politics of self-overcoming, a politics that contests closure.”ccclxxiv  It is not an 
easy task to resist powerful forces, but that does not make doing so less necessary. 
 Of course, Honig does not solely advocate political disruption and contestation, instead 
arguing for a political theory that recognizes the complementary benefits of consensus and 
contestation, of constancy and flux. She has a problem with political theorists who simply refuse 
to acknowledge the value of contestation, who believe that disruption and consensus cannot 
coexist, that the existence of one necessarily endangers the other. She lashes out at the “the 
oppositional structure of the virtue-virtù debate…[which] implies that there is a choice to be 
made between a politics of settlement and a politics of unsettlement, as if any politics could be 
one without the other.”ccclxxv In her view, the two are complementary and each is required for 
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maintenance of the other. Honig is quick to point out that she is not for a system of chaos, or 
constant opposition; she writes, “To affirm the perpetuity of contest is not to celebrate a world 
without points of stabilization.”ccclxxvi  To defend contestation is not to devalue consensus; it is 
this very impulse reversed on the part of ‘virtue’ theorists that Honig decries.  
 Honig wants ‘virtue’ and ‘virtù’ politics to facilitate and challenge each other. She 
believes that this debate opens political space for difference. She is for “a democratic politics of 
augmentation, which strives to maintain the friction between virtue and virtù for the sake of the 
political space engendered by their struggle and endangered by the victory of either impulse over 
the other.”ccclxxvii  She never wants one side to defeat the other. She quotes Max Weber’s “Politics 
as a Vocation” and she supports his vision of an ethic of responsibility complementing an ethic 
of conviction, though she does not make note of, as I have in chapter one, Weber’s apparent 
preference for the former ethic.  
 What is perhaps telling about Honig’s vision of the productive political outsider is that in 
her formulation ‘virtù’ politics more closely align with an ethic of responsibility and ‘virtue’ 
politics with an ethic of conviction. Honig writes that “Weber’s ‘Politics as a Vocation’ 
describes two distinct ethics, an ethic of responsibility (which bears some resemblance to the 
virtù theory developed here) and an ethic of ultimate ends (which bears some resemblance to the 
virtue theory developed here).”ccclxxviii  Her political outsider is not an absolutist but more of a 
compromiser; it is the absolute conception of ‘fittedness’ that the outsider seeks to disrupt. Honig 
does not argue in defense of the moral absolutist who challenges government and societal norms, 
then; she has a vision of a more tolerant, understanding and respectful political outsider who 
poses a challenge. 
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 Honig, then, although she argues for a democracy that values conflict, does not advocate 
for absolutist political outsiders providing that conflict. Her outsider is a respectful one; she 
writes that as she envisions it, “a virtù politics goes beyond magnanimity to gratitude to the 
other.”ccclxxix  She wants to open political space, and she fears that an absolutist activist might 
close it. In a review of her book published in the American Quarterly, Lawrence Biskowski takes 
Honig to task for what he views as her unrealistically mild conception of antagonistic political 
actors.  
For distantly similar reasons, Honig's confidence in the magnanimity of agonistic 
actors is at the very least problematic. The kindness, generosity, and respect for 
difference that she hopes will characterize individuals in a society shaped by the 
spirit of agon and an aesthetic approach to identity-formation are certainly 
possible. So, too, are individuals with some rather less-savory qualities.ccclxxx  
 Honig wants conflict, but how far is she willing to go in her support of political 
disruptions and disagreements? 
 
Olson’s Defense of Fanaticism as a Political Strategy 
 Like me, Joel Olson makes an argument that goes further than Honig’s because it seeks to 
acknowledge the benefits of oppositional political actors whose politics are extreme or 
absolutist—and, on the face of it, therefore, undemocratic. This is important because, as I have 
argued, the difficult oppositional actions that Honig supports often need to be led by absolutist 
political actors who are willing to make the necessary sacrifices and inspire through their own 
moral conviction activism in others. It is also important because absolutist actors are often 
vilified or dismissed and are rarely recognized as potentially contributing positively to 
democracy. 
 Olson makes clear that neither the ‘deliberative’ nor ‘agonal’ branches of democratic 
theory account for political extremist actors. He writes, “Despite an appreciation for the role of 
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conflict in politics, agonal democratic theory’s approach to political conflict is quite similar to its 
purportedly conflict-averse rival.”ccclxxxi  Agonal politics argues for conflict, but it assumes that 
the conflict will not be particularly aggressive or threatening. According to Olson, both theories 
also assume that disagreements will not be over fundamental issues. Olson explains: 
That is, both models overwhelmingly focus on conflict that takes place among 
parties who share a common liberal ethical and political framework that provides 
the principles and rules within which legitimate political contest takes place. 
Contemporary democratic theory lacks an account of fanaticism because it largely 
ignores conflicts over the framework itself.ccclxxxii   
  
 Olson argues that the assumption that the framework is the correct one unfairly 
marginalizes and discounts political extremists whose challenges to the framework could, in his 
estimation, be of democratic value. He comments, “This narrow focus leads democratic theorists 
to assume that extremism is inherently antidemocratic…This assumption, however, presumes the 
inherent justice of the framework in question.”ccclxxxiii  In fact, Olson argues, as I do, that 
absolutist political actors can actually further democratic causes. He argues that in conflicts over 
the existing political and liberal framework, “zealotry can be a democratic tool if it rallies public 
opinion to expand the citizen body and its power. In struggles for hegemony between competing 
frameworks, zealotry can be as useful to radical democrats as it is to fundamentalists.”ccclxxxiv  
Where citizens are empowered and their politics activated because of the political initiatives of 
absolutists or extremists, the role of the latter groups may be a democratic one. 
 Olson uses abolitionist Wendell Philips as an example of a positive fanatical political 
activist who through his actions helped improve and expand American democracy. Olson argues 
that it was Philips’ absolutist approach that helped extend the democratic framework: “By 
drawing lines, repudiating compromise, and pressuring the political middle to choose between 
slaves and masters, Phillips…expanded American democracy beyond the framework of the 
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masters.”ccclxxxv  Olson writes that in situations in which individuals in opposition are fighting for 
democratic ideals against a power that refuses to consider their critique, an absolutist political 
strategy that aims to delineate sides and forces people to choose one can be not only effective, 
but also beneficial to that democracy. 
 Key to Olson’s argument is his claim that there are times when the deliberative and 
agonal political models cannot provide a solution to disagreements that are fundamental and 
involve different conceptions of the best political framework. This occurs when there is a refusal 
to work toward a compromise by at least one of the two parties in opposition. He writes, “Some 
enemies cannot be turned into friends. When parties conflict over the very ethico-political 
framework within which debate takes place, they have reached the horizon of deliberation. The 
only remaining option is struggle.”ccclxxxvi  These are times when “when at least one party has no 
desire to make the compromises needed to construct a common framework.”ccclxxxvii  He 
continues: 
This is the realm of intractable conflict, in which the objective is not to build 
consensus or create ‘friendly enemies’ but to defeat one’s opponent and to install 
one’s framework as the ‘common sense’ of a society. In such a realm, the 
potential for fanaticism exists because it is precisely a strategy to establish a new 
hegemony by mobilizing friends against enemies through an irresolute refusal to 
compromise.ccclxxxviii   
 
Olson writes about the potential benefits of an absolutist, ‘us’ versus ‘them’ political 
conception, and he argues that this strategy can help mobilize people to fight for your cause. He 
writes, “Fanaticism is the political mobilization of the refusal to compromise. It is an approach to 
politics that divides the world into friends and enemies in order to mobilize people in the service 
of a cause one is passionately committed to.”ccclxxxix  Here again we see someone argue for the 
potential benefits of delineating political sides, and this time, contrary to the history of SDS, 
Olson brings to light an example in which the strategy works in the absolutists’ favor. Olson 
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writes, “Zealotry coalesces the forces in a conflict, defines its poles, makes the strongest possible 
case for one pole against the other, and pushes the moderate center to choose sides.”cccxc In this 
view, people are either with or against you. 
The case of Wendell Phillips shows the potential for absolutism as a political strategy. 
Olson talks at length about Phillips’ efforts to draw strict lines between abolitionists and those in 
favor of slavery. Writes Olson, “Phillips does not talk to mend fences but to draw lines. In other 
words, Phillips does not employ talk to moderate conflict but to increase political agitation in a 
struggle for hegemony.”cccxci Phillips’ wanted to identify the other side as an enemy that was 
morally corrupt and needed to be defeated—not compromised with. “Phillips’s goal is not to 
achieve consensus through deliberation or to turn enemies into adversaries but to foster two 
hostile camps.”cccxcii  The goal was to break the issue into binaries, a fight of good versus evil, and 
to build public support behind the ‘good’ side: “Abolitionist agitation crystallizes politics into 
freedom and slavery, right and wrong, salvation and sin, democracy and tyranny.”cccxciii  
Phillips’ defense of John Brown’s attack on Harpers Ferry is similar to arguments made 
by SDS members that once these lines were drawn, absolutist and militant action needed to make 
it clear that people really did have to take sides. The public had to know that the opposition was 
serious in its claims: it was ‘us’ or ‘them’ and activists were willing to back up their aggressive 
rhetoric. Olson writes, “Phillips did not [condemn it] because he saw Harpers Ferry as 
embodying the function of talk, which is not just deliberation or agonistic engagement but also 
agitation.”cccxciv Absolutist and militant action was a way of mobilizing the public into making a 
choice once the sides were clearly drawn. 
 Phillips wanted to instill the abolitionist framework in place of the current one, and he 
insisted that Abraham Lincoln declare that he would make every effort to force the abolitionist 
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framework onto the South. He said, “Lincoln must not sit on the fence any longer. He 
must…identify his friends and his enemies, and act accordingly to defeat ‘‘the South’’ and install 
‘‘the North’’ as the new national common sense.”cccxcv This argument certainly seems similar to 
that made by members in the Black Power movement and absolutists and radicals in SDS.  
And Olson takes the case of Wendell Phillips to show that this political strategy, for that 
is how he views absolutism, can be a successful—and democratic—one. He writes, “The fact 
that we are all abolitionists today confirms that there can be democratic potential in the fanatical 
encouragement of intractable conflict.”cccxcvi  Phillips’ conceptualization of the issue of slavery as 
a conflict for which deliberation and debate would not suffice was adopted by enough Americans 
for a Civil War to be fought; and his side was strong enough to win and force its more inclusive, 
democratic framework onto parts of the country that had opposed it.  
Like my own, a key aspect of Olson’s defense of political extremists, then, is their 
assumed dedication to democratic practices and goals—it is when they wish to expand the 
democratic framework or identify how the current system is not meeting the standards of that 
framework that political fanatics may contribute positively to democracy. He only defends 
political extremism when it aims to make democracy better. Olson writes, “Zealotry contributes 
to democracy when it is put in the service of a more democratic common sense.”cccxcvii  He 
continues: “For this reason, democratic theorists should not automatically condemn it…[but] 
evaluate it according to the same criteria they use to assess other forms of political activity: does 
it expand the ability of ordinary people to participate in those affairs that affect their daily 
life?”cccxcviii  And he makes clear that an absolutist stance, though it might lead to violent 
practices, need not always do so: “Laws prohibiting the use or threat of physical force exclude 
violent extremists, but not all extremists advocate violence.”cccxcix  Like Honig, he wants to 
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expand and open political space and he thinks that sometimes an absolutist political strategy, 
when its goals are democratic, is an effective and valuable way to do that.  
Like Honig before him, Olson at the end of his piece makes clear that he is not always 
advocating for political disagreement, nor does he want to suggest that compromise is not often 
the better route of action. He acknowledges that “extremism is not always or even usually 
democratic, of course. Extremism certainly can be put toward violent and antidemocratic ends 
and often has, as the history of this short century already attests. Nor is this to deny the 
importance of compromise and moderation in democratic politics.”cd His point is that absolutists 
should not be dismissed without careful consideration as to their democratic contributions. His 
argument is that “some fanatics may make genuine contributions to democratic practice, as I 
argue below, and thus their exclusion would be detrimental to democratic theory.”cdi To discount 
the absolutist political strategy would limit democratic theory’s explanatory value. 
 Similar to my approach with Dovi, Olson credits Honig and agonal theorists for 
recognizing that conflict can benefit democracy but criticizes them for not following their 
theories through to the end. He writes that despite their professed appreciation for disagreement, 
“agonistic democratic theories also place largely unacknowledged limits on political 
contestation.”cdii As he sees it, such theories only explain disagreements between individuals who 
are, at the end of the day, still willing to compromise. He writes, “Agonism, however, involves 
conflict with an adversary with whom one struggles but respects and therefore does not seek to 
destroy…In other words, these agonal theories have much to say about adversaries but little to 
say about enemies proper.”cdiii This failure to look at situations in which compromise is viewed 
as an impossibility by at least one of the parties does not acknowledge relations of power and 
how oppositional frameworks sometimes need to be fought over for one to be established as the 
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norm. Olson comments, “[Agonal theorists] do important work in defending the constructive role 
of conflict in politics but they do not much consider hegemony or its tension with agonism.”cdiv 
Sometimes deliberative and friendly antagonistic challenges cannot provide a solution to 
fundamental disagreements: this is something I have argued as well.   
But the way Olson looks at absolutism is one area in which Olson and I part company: 
while I view moral absolutism as a reaction—political but also emotional, public but also 
private—of some to what they see as repressive social, political or economic forces, Olson is 
more detached from the concept of political fanaticism, solely viewing it as a specific type of 
political strategy. It makes sense then that he argues that political fanatics can be rational—he 
notes, “Phillips epitomizes an Enlightenment faith in the power of reason to triumph over 
coercion.”cdv He thinks of absolutism as a rational choice taken by political actors to achieve 
their desired ends. 
Seeing that some people fighting in oppositional social movements are morally absolute, 
I look at their political importance within those movements and with regard to the greater 
democracy; Olson looks at moral absolutism as a strategy chosen by individuals because they 
feel that it can best bring them political success. He writes, “Extremism is neither a vice nor a 
virtue but an approach to politics that emerges in times of profound social and political 
tension.”cdvi In his mind, absolutism is a political tactic that leaders may choose to adopt if they 
think doing so would be advantageous; the implication is that they could drop this strategy if 
there is still time and they don’t think it will be successful. 
I believe that being morally absolute cannot only be a political calculation, because the 
willingness to sacrifice oneself that comes with and from such an uncompromising stance, 
especially when one stands in opposition to a more powerful political force, comes from 
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somewhere deeper and cannot just be discarded or adopted as it best fits a political actor. So 
when Olson argues that “zealotry is essentially a means rather than an end,”cdvii I would argue 
that he undersells the difficulty and complexity that is attached to taking a politically extremist 
position—that he views it as a decision, or a political calculation, when really the commitment 
runs deeper. He neglects to recognize adequately the extraordinary personal strength that is a 
prerequisite for an individual to take a morally absolutist stance against a more powerful foe. I 
argue that for someone to take up absolutism as a political strategy he must already have that 
commitment or willingness to commit, and that this does not come easy—that his absolutism 
must in some ways be an end before he can use it for political means. 
 
It’s Personal: On Conviction, John Brown and the Individual Moral Absolutist 
 It is often the life stories of moral absolutists who lead oppositional social movements 
with whose aim we agree that inspire us and make vivid the causes for which they were fighting. 
Whether we see them develop into the hardheaded leaders they become or remember them as 
particularly moralistic from a young age, there is a sense that they took the uncompromising 
stances they did because they felt that they had to—that they were morally compelled to do so. It 
is this kind of natural and unrelenting commitment that separates these individuals from 
followers and others outside the movement whose priorities either lie elsewhere or are not so 
firmly connected to the particular cause. It is their passion that inspires us—and we typically 
believe, contrary to Olson, that their dedication to a cause is not the result of sober political 
calculation, but rather something that even they might not understand—some force that imbues 
them with the moral urgency that people so rarely exhibit. It is often their irrationality, not their 
rationality, that inspires us, for it is seemingly irrational to give one’s life to a cause, or to 
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renounce all of one’s privilege. Their lives take on a certain mystique because we want to know 
how it is that they could reach such a high level of moral conviction.  
 Olson takes as his case Wendell Phillips, but a more challenging and potentially 
rewarding absolutist abolitionist to take as a case might be John Brown. Brown is more difficult 
to defend because he used violence in his fight against slavery, and because more than Phillips or 
other abolitionists, he sought to fully and completely adhere to his moral principles in his own 
life, which often made him appear irrational and isolating, and also placed him further outside 
and in opposition to the political and liberal framework that existed at the time. Brown’s actions 
were often not very well thought-out, and he was less of an astute political activist than a man 
improbably and somewhat inexplicably committed to ridding the country of slavery—by 
whatever means necessary. It is important to look at an individual like John Brown because to 
only look at absolutism as a political strategy is to miss why absolutists inspire us; why they are 
such controversial figures; and why their critiques often gather so much attention, and their 
influence is felt so widely and for so long. 
 One thing that is known about John Brown is that he was absolutist in his convictions, 
which were based in Calvinist thought. David S. Reynolds makes this clear in his book John 
Brown, Abolitionist: The Man Who Killed Slavery, Sparked the Civil War, and Seeded Civil 
Rights. Reynolds writes, “Both enemies and friends of John Brown, then, considered him a deep-
dyed Puritan. They were right.”cdviii Like his father, Brown believed that “God was absolutely 
sovereign, and humans were absolutely helpless in the face of God’s power. There was no 
middle ground…God determined everything.”cdix Like SDS members who saw that democratic 
principles were not being met and felt that they needed to act, Brown saw Christian principles 
violated and felt compelled to act. Reynolds writes that while at that time “shockingly few white 
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Christians admitted that blacks were included in the Golden Rule,”cdx Brown was unwilling to 
make a similar concession. 
 And yet because Brown would become so fervently committed to the anti-slavery cause, 
he would adopt violent tactics that were only questionably in line with his religious teachings—
and the arguments of other abolitionists at the time, who preached a non-violent approach. 
According to Reynolds, “The other Abolitionists were, by and large, pacifists, and they would 
maintain their pacifism…John Brown began as a pacifist…[but] his antislavery convictions 
overwhelmed his pacifism.”cdxi In his view, pacifism was a preference that would not suffice for 
a disagreement on which neither side was willing to compromise. Reynolds writes that the 
reason Brown “departed from the likes of Garrison and Emerson was his belief (and time proved 
him right) that voluntary liberation was unlikely to happen in America, since Southerners’ 
devotion to their particular institution was steadily strengthening.”cdxii In Brown’s eyes, “No 
other problem…called for the use of arms.”cdxiii Brown wanted to be a pacifist, but his moral 
conviction that slavery was a grave evil took precedence. 
 Brown was unlike other abolitionists in the degree to which he backed up his rhetoric 
with actions that affirmed his belief in racial equality. Reynolds writes, “In this cultural sea of 
racism, John Brown stands out of his utter lack of prejudice. This is not to say that he was the 
only nonracist white in North America…But Brown was the only one to both model his lifestyle 
and his plans for abolishing slavery on black culture.”cdxiv Unlike many others, “John Brown put 
action behind his words.”cdxv There is evidence that Brown truly treated blacks as his equals, and 
that other leading abolitionists did not. Reynolds writes that “most white Abolitionists of the day 
were racists who did not like working with blacks,”cdxvi and he notes that in 1831 William Lloyd 
Garrison’s American Anti-Slavery Society had only three blacks in the group’s sixty-three-
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person planning session. Brown on the other hand created an oppositional plan that depended on 
the rebellion and bravery of blacks. 
 Further, Brown made it clear that he was willing to, and ultimately would, make the 
ultimate sacrifice—his life—for the fight to end slavery, while many other abolitionists balked at 
sacrificing their privilege and aimed for a gradualist vision for change. Reynolds notes that 
individuals were inspired by his commitment, and in the end many “willingly joined him in the 
cause he was ready to die for.”cdxvii Brown opposed the gradualism of other anti-slavery 
advocates, like William Seward, who, along with Abraham Lincoln, “looked forward to slavery’s 
ultimate extinction, gradually and at some distant time—perhaps in five decades, he once said 
(Lincoln guessed a century)—but not through force.”cdxviii Reynolds writes that while they were 
“committed to improving the social condition of blacks, these Republican leaders did not escape 
the racial prejudice prevalent in the area.”cdxix But Brown was unwilling to postpone an issue that 
he felt carried such moral import: “Brown did not like to wait for events to push him. He pushed, 
and events followed.”cdxx He felt that an evil as great as slavery should not be tolerated—for any 
amount of time. 
 Like other absolutists we have encountered, though more by example and action than 
most of them, Brown worked to delineate sides and make clear that it was his or theirs. Reynolds 
describes his polarizing image: “John Brown was Christ. John Brown was Satan. In the not 
distant future, the two views would come into violent collision.”cdxxi Even in music 
reproductions, Brown was a controversial figure. Reynolds writes, “But Brown had stirred deep 
political passions…The divided opinions over Brown produced verse that was sharply 
contrasting in tone.”cdxxii According to Reynolds, Brown moved the nation toward war. He 
writes, “If John Brown had driven the South to a secessionist fury, he had at the same time 
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carried the North toward unified action against slavery.”cdxxiii  Eventually, the North and South 
would play out Brown’s conception and labeling of them as uncompromising sides in the Civil 
War. 
 In Reynolds’ view, Brown provided an absolutist view that was necessary at a time when 
moral compromise ruled. He writes, “In a larger sense there was a dire need for a self-reliant, 
sincere individual utterly dedicated to a cause. Both sides of the slavery struggle had produced 
craven compromisers…An alternative kind of person was needed.”cdxxiv Brown saw a 
government that was not meeting its promises to the people or following the commands of God, 
and he felt that it was his duty to challenge it—directly. By attacking a federal arsenal at Harpers 
Ferry, Brown, Reynolds claims, “was not only targeting slavery but also challenging the national 
government.”cdxxv Brown was not challenging the foundational principles of the government, but 
rather the system’s willingness to compromise on those very principles. According to Reynolds, 
what Brown wanted was the “natural fulfillment of the ideal of equality announced in the 
Declaration of Independence…what the American government really was, underneath the racism 
and corruption that currently spoiled it.”cdxxvi  Reynolds writes, “Brown’s goal was a democratic 
society that assigned full rights to all, irrespective of religion, race, or gender.”cdxxvii There had 
been compromise in government where there should not have been. 
 Brown’s critique was a moral one rooted in religious and democratic principles. Reynolds 
describes Brown as a man who refused, under any circumstances, to sacrifice his morality. He 
writes that Brown “seemed the embodiment of virtue. He was moral to the point of prissiness. 
Redpath noted that no swearing or drinking was permitted in the camp.”cdxxviii  Brown’s 
seriousness often alienated and intimidated others, and as is the case with many other social 
activists, it kept him away from his family for long stretches of time—ultimately, taking him 
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away from them for good. His absolutism, then, and his prioritization of the fight against slavery 
above all else, was not without its personal consequences. 
 It also led Brown to commit violent acts that were morally questionable. The 
Pottawatomie slaughter is the best example of such a case. Brown and his men slaughtered five 
pro-slavery men “on a negligible pretext, using a sneak attack when the enemy was defenseless, 
and with disregard for possible punishment.”cdxxix Reynolds writes that the legacy of Brown’s 
violence—some might calls his acts terrorism—have confused his legacy. He writes, “A key 
difficulty modern Americans have with Brown is that his goal—the abolition of slavery—was 
undeniably good, but his violent methods are hard to swallow.”cdxxx In this way especially, 
Brown is a more complex case than that of Wendell Phillips. 
 Reynolds ultimately defends John Brown, largely because in his mind, although the 
tactics Brown used are not easy ones to accept, they would later be mirrored in the brutal Civil 
War that would follow Brown—a war that Reynolds argues was necessary to end slavery, and 
was less harmful than it would have been had it occurred later, without the push that Brown 
provided. Speaking of the failed Harpers Ferry raid, Reynolds writes, “The raid and its aftermath 
prefigured the Civil War in uncanny ways—it was almost the Civil War in microcosm.”cdxxxi 
Reynolds points out that the War, which largely began as an effort to preserve the Union, 
eventually took on a more Abolitionist tone. He writes that “though Brown did not live to see the 
[Civil War], he embodied its spirit in advance,”cdxxxii  and Reynolds goes on to compare the 
abolitionist stance that Lincoln would eventually take to the one that Brown had died preaching 
six years earlier. 
Reynolds argues “that the war become more and more John Brown’s war. It was largely 
because the North increasingly adopted Brown’s aims and his tactics that it defeated the 
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South.”cdxxxiii  Southerners had historically been the ones to strike fear into Northerners hearts; it 
had been Southern mobs that had ruthlessly murdered groups of antislavery activists. According 
to Reynolds, “the historical record indicates that the proslavery side committed most acts of 
violence.”cdxxxiv Even though Brown’s acts were violent, perhaps they were necessary to overturn 
a system that others had a strong interest in maintaining—and were willing to fight hard to keep. 
In the end, Reynolds argues that “Brown emerges as a positive agent for change, because he 
forced a war that would have come anyway but could only have been worse than it was.”cdxxxv 
The tactics may have been harsh, but also necessary. In recognizing that Brown was violent but 
in the end praising his contribution to democracy, Reynolds goes further than Olson: sometimes 
violence may be necessary to expand the democratic framework. 
 Reynolds ends the piece with a defense of Brown and what he sees as his necessary 
absolutist critique of society, and one that we should make room for in the future. 
America has become a vast network of institutions that tend to stifle vigorous 
challenges from individuals. Such challenges are needed if the nation is to remain 
healthy. There must be modern Americans who identify with the oppressed with 
such passion that they are willing to die for them, as Brown did. And America 
must be large enough to allow for meaningful protest, instead of remaining 
satisfied with patriotic bromides and a capitalist mass culture that fosters 
homogenized complacency. Unless America is ready at every moment to see its 
own failings, it is one step closer to becoming the tyrannical monster is pretends 
not to be…What would have happened if Brown had not violently disrupted the 
racist juggernaut that was America?cdxxxvi   
 
 Another question that might be valuable to ask is why did Brown not only hold views that 
were extremely progressive for his time, but also why did he hold them absolutely? It does not 
appear that Brown solely chose to be absolutist because, as Olson suggests he might, he thought 
it could be an effective political strategy. Part of the reason is likely related to his Calvinist 
upbringing and strong religious faith, but another reason is that Brown simply felt compelled to 
sacrifice his life for the antislavery cause—he took slavery and America’s failure to live up to its 
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own and God’s principles as a personal affront. Reynolds’ terms Brown’s fight a “personal battle 
against slavery.”cdxxxvii  It was an irrational, personal effort to end slavery that first inspired 
Brown and later so many others to join Brown’s fight. 
 
Conflict and Conviction 
 Honig and other agonal theorists do not acknowledge the potentially positive influence of 
moral absolutists on democracy because, as Olson points out, they do not include conflicts in 
which the disagreements are greater in scale and more aggressive in nature—they do not include 
room for absolutists, but rather individuals who hold more respect for their political opponents 
and the system in which they operate. But Olson also does not fully capture moral absolutists, 
only viewing absolutism as a political strategy and not as something more fundamental. It is 
because absolutists take things personally and act emotionally and irrationally that they can be so 
inspiring, divisive, and scary—understanding and valuing them as extraordinary individuals is 
essential to seeing why they are important to us, and important to democracy. 
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Conclusion: Wrapping Up Thoughts, Considering Which 
Perspective is Needed When, and Tying the Discussion into a 
Larger One on Torture, with Real Consequences for Today’s 
Political Decisions      
 As I have shown through a historical look at SDS, the dirty-hands debate errs when its 
adherents only extol the virtues of moral compromisers as political actors. Moral absolutists, 
when their political critique and moral anger is grounded in a democratic belief that individual 
rights are being violated and must no longer be compromised on, can make possible significant 
compromise because they both make clear that there are very different and irreconcilable stances 
and because they aim to hold dirty-hands politicians accountable for their actions. That is, they 
ensure that there is something to compromise on and that the individual who does so does not 
take compromising his morals lightly. Although they cannot make the dirty-hands politician feel 
guilt, absolutists can make it clear to him that he will have to stand by and discuss whatever 
decision he does make—they can make the decision to sacrifice his morals a more difficult one. 
Moral absolutists of the vein I have described often reintroduce morality into places where it has 
dulled, and can remind us that we are not living in accordance with our democratic and moral 
principles.  
Dovi recognizes that absolutists can benefit democracy, but she does not recognize 
adequately that to make their critique heard and felt by dirty-hands politicians and the public, 
absolutists will at times have—and may be inclined—to take a powerful, directly antagonistic 
stand against those in power and with whom they so fervently disagree. Those in power are often 
not, as Dovi imagines, voluntarily willing to consider others’ suggestions and complaints. Like 
Honig and other agonal political theorists, Dovi acknowledges that not only compromise but also 
conflict can improve democracy, but both groups stop short of appreciating conflicts between 
two powerful sides that refuse to compromise on issues and do not respect each other—leaving it 
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to the public to make a choice. Olson does appreciate such conflicts, but he does not fully 
appreciate the absolutist actors who spearhead them; Olson instead views absolutism as a 
political strategy that an individual chooses to adopt or reject based on his dry, rational 
evaluation of what will bring him the most political success. 
But to view absolutism in this light is to miss why absolutists are often so inspiring or 
terrifying to a public more inclined toward compromise; damages their critique by trying to fit 
absolutism into a political model that emphasizes rationality and distance from emotion; and 
undersells the absolutist individuals, whose willingness to sacrifice themselves for a cause 
typically not in their immediate interest is viewed as calculated and not brave or the result of 
moral conviction of a strength never attained by most people. It is to miss their value as 
extraordinary individuals. Absolutists are interesting to us because they often appear irrational, 
emotional, and because they explain their actions as something that they simply knew they had, 
or were compelled to do; they often struggle to provide a rational explanation that goes beyond 
restating their conviction. It is their passion that is so essential in leading an oppositional social 
movement that faces tall odds, toward confrontations that require real sacrifices that, in the case 
of SDS, could have potentially led to rewarding negotiations between the liberal ‘enemy’ and 
compromisers within the SDS organization. 
SDS perhaps could have benefitted from more absolutist commitment within its ranks; 
often it appeared that members were not willing to live up to their own critique and the sacrifice 
of gender, race, and class privileges that doing so would have entailed. And yet I agree with 
Gitlin when he says that SDS and its critique of morally compromising politicians had a lasting, 
positive influence on American democracy. It showed politicians that they could be held 
publically accountable for their decisions, and it reminded them that morality should both be 
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present and not easily compromised in those decisions. SDS and New Left efforts ultimately 
widened the political spectrum to accept and consider more alternatives than those to which a 
consensus-driven political center had been open. SDS delineated lines between ‘us’ and a liberal 
establishment they separated as a completely unlike ‘them’. Although the public would 
ultimately choose the other side, drawing those lines and making clear that there were strongly-
held differences between the two benefitted democracy, which is as much about living with and 
sometimes deciding between difference as it is about compromise and consensus. 
 
Why This Perspective, Now? 
 Like other authors we have looked at, then, I do not attempt to argue that compromise 
and consensus are not very necessary and important aspects of democracy, but rather that there 
should also be room in political theory for oppositional moral absolutists whose moral impetus 
comes from a personal reaction to what they perceive as a failure of the country to live up to its 
democratic principles and promises. Olson is right to recognize that political extremism, as I 
noted in the last chapter, often “emerges in times of profound social and political tension.”cdxxxviii  
Often it is moral absolutists whose moral conviction and dedication to their cause must move 
democracy forward and extend its privileges, even if their tactics, potentially violent and based 
on the forces they are up against, appear undemocratic. 
 But if this is not always the case, it follows logically that at other times the perspective 
and attitude that a democracy needs is not one of moral absolutism and conflict, but rather moral 
compromise and consensus. One time that might call for the latter attitude is the moment 
following a culminating confrontation between oppositional moral absolutists and the politicians 
in power—after the sides have been made clear, and the public has chosen one of them, 
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assuming it has not, as was the case with the Civil War, split itself among the two parties and 
decided to settle the issue in a protracted war. In this view, the decision of many SDS members 
to lay down their weapons and accept the public’s decision following the Democratic National 
Convention confrontation might be seen in a positive light, and not as a signal that they had 
given up or lacked moral conviction. It might be seen as parallel to the first American 
presidential election in which power was exchanged from one political party to the other, which 
Thomas Jefferson would hail as a “bloodless revolution.”cdxxxix In this sense, even absolutists, 
while they wouldn’t have to compromise on their morals, might have to recognize, as a 
democratic gesture, that the progress for which they are calling may have to arrive at a later date, 
when the public can be won over to their side. 
 Right now, however, there is little cause for concern that the attitude of prominent 
political theorists—even agonal ones—leans too heavily toward conflict and absolutism. As 
Shugarman notes, dirty-hands theory promotes a political system in which political decisions are 
made by individuals at elite levels who do not feel as if they need to explain their actions to the 
public—there is no accountability or democratic dialogue between leader and people. The moral 
dilemma is a private one for the political actor, who assumes both that he is making the right 
decision and that the people want him to make it. The theory explicitly defends antidemocratic 
and extralegal practices, from rigging an election to going back on campaign promises made to 
the general public. It is in this particular political theory context that I argue for moral absolutists 
who might hold these politicians accountable; refuse to compromise on important democratic 
principles; and do so by challenging them directly and at times selflessly, as only individuals 
completely committed to a cause can do, and as might be necessary in a fight against a more 
powerful foe. 
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The Torture Debate 
 The push and pull between dirty-hands theory and moral absolutism is in some respect an 
applied case of a larger debate between consequentialism and deontology, though it does not fit 
the parameters of that debate exactly.cdxl Narrowing one’s focus and applying general theory to 
certain, more specific circumstances reflects on the greater debate’s points and relevance; it also 
shows that the questions I have engaged in this thesis have been and are being discussed 
elsewhere and are of some practical import. In particular, they have been discussed relatively 
recently as the issue of how the United States should interrogate suspected terrorists has become 
an area of national interest and concern. 
 In a collection of essays on torture, the issues and arguments that have come up in this 
thesis find frequent expression. Central to the debate on torture, a practice that most of the 
writers consider to be in violation of democratic principles, is first whether or not torture is 
inevitable in the War on Terror; and secondly, if it is, if that means we should accept it as a 
reality and try to develop ways to legalize or evaluate the justice of its use in specific situations, 
or if we should still view it as absolutely wrong and unacceptable in all instances. Walzer 
assumes that politics are and will always be dirty; since he wants some moral men to be in 
politics, then, he argues that they must be willing to sacrifice their personal morals both to get 
into office and to make decisions once they’ve been elected—but to feel guilty about having 
done so. If the politician is personally against torture, he must still give the order to torture if it is 
the utilitarian choice to be made. 
 But many writers challenge Walzer and others who are willing to compromise on 
democratic and moral principles—and, as I have already noted Shugarman argues, in the process 
make it appear that violating these principles is not such a significant transgression. In an essay 
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that takes aim at the arguments of Alan Dershowitz,cdxli Elaine Scarry insists that there should be 
an absolute ban on torture. Just because something is going on that is wrong does not mean we 
should excuse it. She writes, “That one might have to do something someday that is wrong does 
not mean that the act has ceased to be ‘wrong’ or ‘punishable.’”cdxlii In addition, she takes aim at 
Walzer’s assumption that the political actor knows the right utilitarian action: “What instead 
makes the ticking bomb scenario improbable is the notion that in a world where knowledge is 
ordinarily so imperfect, we are suddenly granted the omniscience to know that the person in front 
of us holds this crucial information about the bomb’s whereabouts.”cdxliii Moral compromises 
seem more questionable when they are not definitively made for the greater good, a fact to which 
SDS protestors would attest regarding the Vietnam War. 
While Walzer might respond that he is not, as Dershowitz proposes, saying that rigging 
an election or torturing a suspect should be legalized, I would argue that Scarry’s criticism still 
largely holds for Walzer. Walzer, by suggesting that the moral politician is one who is willing to 
commit those acts, endorses the antidemocratic practices and ultimately makes it less likely that 
dirty-hands politicians will, as Walzer wants them to, weigh heavily transgressing their morals. 
Scarry insightfully writes that providing a defense of torture “eliminates the felt-aversiveness to 
cruelty that acts as a way to test one’s level of conviction.”cdxliv Walzer’s dirty-hands theory 
depends upon the politician struggling through a moral dilemma and feeling guiltily about 
having broken his personal morals, but Walzer does not acknowledge how explicitly accepting 
that moral compromises will have to be made makes that dilemma and deliberation process less 
meaningful and productive. 
 Andrew Sullivan argues that there are some principles on which we should never 
compromise. Sullivan is not alone when he argues that “torture, in any form and in any 
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circumstances, is…antithetical to the most basic principles for which the United States 
stands.”cdxlv His answer to the issue of torture, then, is simple: “The only way to control torture is 
to ban it outright. Everywhere.”cdxlvi Sullivan questions our real commitment to democratic 
principles and ideals if we are willing to accept their violation: “If we abandon our ideals in the 
face of adversity and aggression, then those ideals were never really in our possession.”cdxlvii 
Perhaps what is rational and easy is not the right choice. 
 Richard Weisberg goes so far as to compare lawyers who defend torture to those who in 
Vichy, France rationalized the racism of the Nazis and helped create and enforce racist practices 
there. With regard to the ticking bomb scenario, Weisberg does not ask for a thoughtful rational 
argument as to whether torture should be permitted or not, but a straightforward, absolutist one; 
he writes, “It is the complex rationalizers who wind up being more naïve than those who speak 
strictly, directly, and simply against injustice.”cdxlviii  Weisberg boldly claims this oppositional 
absolutist stance is the brave one; he argues that those who do not make it lack “the will to 
mount a [anti-Vichy lawyer who protested the government’s racism, Jacques] Maury-style 
protest.”cdxlix Sometimes, Weisberg insists, we should be willing to listen to those who stand in 
opposition and declare, bravely and in simple terms, that they will not compromise their morals 
to better match those of the majority, or to better accommodate any supposed political reality—
that they will not, never, under any circumstances, betray their personal morals. He might be on 
to something. 
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